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Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

This paper analyzes how private decisions and public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences (values), material or other explicit incentives (laws) and social sanctions or rewards (norms). It first examines how honor, stigma and social norms arise from individuals’ behaviors...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371470

Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets

Armour, John; Mayer, Colin; Polo, Andrea - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

reputation and regulatory policy. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682887

Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration

Iossa, Elisabetta; Rey, Patrick - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We study how career concerns affect the dynamics of incentives in a multi-period contract, when the agent’s productivity is a stochastic function of his past productivity and investment. We show that incentives are stronger and performance is higher when the contract approaches its expiry...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083903

Reputation and Entry in Procurement

Butler, Jeff; Carbone, Enrica; Conzo, Pierluigi; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

experiment exploring the relationship between reputation and entry in procurement. We implement a repeated procurement game with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083951

Constrained Discretion and Central Bank Transparency

Bianchi, Francesco; Melosi, Leonardo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

central bank reputation and transparency. Monetary policy alternates between periods of active inflation stabilization and … pessimistic about future monetary policy and uncertainty gradually rises. Reputation determines the speed with which agents … found to benefit from strong reputation and large flexibility in responding to inflationary shocks. Increasing transparency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084074

Information Management in Banking Crises

Shapiro, Joel; Skeie, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

A regulator resolving a bank faces two audiences: depositors, who may run if they believe the regulator will not provide capital, and banks, which may take excess risk if they believe the regulator will provide capital. When the regulator's cost of injecting capital is private information, it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084160

Reputational Contagion and Optimal Regulatory Forbearance

Morrison, Alan; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Existing studies suggest that systemic crises may arise because banks either hold correlated assets, or are connected by interbank lending. This paper shows that common regulation is also a conduit for interbank contagion. One bank’s failure may undermine confidence in the banking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084273

Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation

Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

preferences in combination with reputation opportunities keep principals from abusing their power, leading to the widespread …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084462

Ratings Quality over the Business Cycle

Bar-Isaac, Heski; Shapiro, Joel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

behavior is disciplined by reputational concerns, the value of reputation depends on economic fundamentals that vary over the … for analysts, and expectations about the future. We analyze a dynamic model of ratings where reputation is endogenous and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784750

Dynamic Incentive Contracts under Parameter Uncertainty

Jovanovic, Boyan; Prat, Julien - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing the productivity of the relationship, and featuring a hidden action for the agent. We develop an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and noise are normally distributed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784751