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Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders: Do They Matter When Ownership Is Concentrated?

Hamdani, Assaf; Yafeh, Yishay - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We shed new light on the corporate governance role of institutional investors in markets where concentrated ownership and business groups are prevalent. When companies have controlling shareholders, institutional investors, as minority shareholders, can play only a limited role in corporate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554240

Voucher Privatization, Corporate Control and the Cost of Capital: An Analysis of the Czech Privatization Programme

Marcincin, Anton; van Wijnbergen, Sweder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

Voucher privatization programmes have been criticized for leading to excessively dispersed ownership and hence failure of control and insufficient corporate governance. We analyse the results of the five auction rounds of the Czech privatization programme and subsequent stock market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123768

Equity Block Transfers in Transition Economies: Evidence from Poland

Trojanowski, Grzegorz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper investigates valuation effects of share block transfers and employs agency theory to explain the determinants of block premia. A sample of transactions from Poland is used to measure benefits and costs of ownership concentration. Block premia are found to be substantially lower than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124379

Corporate Governance Externalities

Acharya, Viral V; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We argue that the choice of corporate governance by a firm affects and is affected by the choice of governance by other firms. Firms with weaker governance give higher payoffs to their management to incentivize them. This forces firms with good governance to also pay their management more than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136630

Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection

Burkart, Mike; Panunzi, Fausto - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper analyses the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, and ownership concentration. In our framework, blockholder and manager are distinct parties and the presence of a blockholder can both protect and hurt minority shareholders. Legal shareholder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662105

On the Role of Bank Competition for Corporate Finance and Corporate Control in Transition Economies

Schnitzer, Monika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

, banks compete to finance an investment project with uncertain return. By screening the firm a bank learns about its …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792444

Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?

Dyck, Alexander; Morse, Adair; Zingales, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

What external control mechanisms are most effective in detecting corporate fraud? To address this question we study in depth all reported cases of corporate fraud in companies with more than 750 million dollars in assets between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on one...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791779

The Political Economy of Bank and Equity Dominance

Perotti, Enrico C; von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

Legislation affects corporate governance and the return to human and financial capital. We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the governance structure and the extent of labour rents. In a society where median voters have relatively more at stake in the form of human...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667054

Red Barons or Robber Barons? Governance and Financing in Russian FIG

Gelfer, Stanislav; Perotti, Enrico C - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

We study the governance role of Russian Financial-Industrial Groups (FIG) and their impact on financing of investment … and employee control. We find that investment is sensitive to internal finance for the second set of firms but not for the … first; in fact, we find that cash flow is negatively correlated with investment in the FIG group firms. This is consistent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123859

Financial Frictions, Investment, and Institutions

Claessens, Stijn; Ueda, Kenichi; Yafeh, Yishay - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

frictions using a canonical investment model. We consider two channels by which frictions affect investment: (i) through … frictions, institutions affect investment. We find that improved corporate governance (e.g., less severe informational problems …) and enhanced contractual enforcement reduce financial frictions affecting investment, while stronger creditor rights (e …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784722

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