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Consider a seller who can make an observable but non-contractible investment to improve an intermediate good that is specialized to a particular buyer's needs. The buyer then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. The seller has private information about the fraction of the ex post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009001060
An inventor can invest research effort to come up with an innovation. Once an innovation is made, a contract is negotiated and unobservable effort must be exerted to develop a product. In the absence of liability constraints, the inventor's investment incentives are increasing in his bargaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084016
Given symmetric information, in a standard hold-up problem a buyer's investment incentives are always increasing in his bargaining power. While this result is robust under one-sided private information, it can be overturned under two-sided private information.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662012
, contracts governing these transactions are incomplete, and the matching between final-good producers and input suppliers may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123895
We study the impact of import protection on relationship-specific investments, organizational choice and welfare. We show that a tariff on intermediate inputs can improve social welfare through mitigating hold-up problems. It does so if it discriminates in favor of the investing parties, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008680752
particular, this Paper shows that when matching is assortative and sellers’ investments precede market competition then …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136606
. After outlining the theory, the paper uses feedback mechanisms to organise Europe’s postwar integration narrative, and then …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468652
Using a detailed data set at the tariff line level, we find an emulator effect of multilateralism on subsequent regional trade agreements involving the US. We exploit the variation in the frequency with which the US has granted immediate duty free access (IDA) to its Free Trade Area partners...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468716
Are there systematic forces such that countries of different sizes participating in a free trade bloc gain differently from the entry of new members? If economies of scale imply that firms located in large countries enjoy lower costs, then the gains from enlarging the bloc will fall...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124172
forces might drive them, and what the WTO might do to guide them. Two facts form the point of departure: 1) Regionalism is … multilateralisation of regionalism. The paper presents the political economy logic of trade liberalisation and uses it to structure a … building blocs – whereby offshoring creates a force that encourages the multilateralisation of regionalism. Finally, the paper …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067492