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Dollarization, Bailouts and the Stability of the Banking System
Gale, Douglas M; Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
Central bank policy suffers from time-inconsistency when facing a banking crisis: A bailout is optimal ex post but ex ante it should be limited to control moral hazard. Dollarization provides a credible commitment not to help at the cost of not helping even when it would be ex ante optimal to do...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788955
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Gambling for resurrection in Iceland: the rise and fall of the banks
Baldursson, Fridrik Mar; Portes, Richard - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
liquidity until their collapse. An official report (SIC, 2010) has, however, exposed severe weaknesses in the banks’ assets and … borrowers, while they should have been deleveraging and securing their liquidity positions in foreign currency. The banks also … before the collapse of October 2008 the banks all reported strong liquidity positions. These reports were misleading, but we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084274
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Public Policy Towards R&D in Oligopolistic Industries
Leahy, Dermot; Neary, J Peter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995
This paper examines the free-market and socially-optimal outcomes in a dynamic oligopoly model with R&D spillovers. First-best optimal subsidies to R&D are higher when firms play strategically against each other, but lower when they cooperate on R&D (at least with high spillovers) and when they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789170
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When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games
Mailath, George J.; Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
In repeated normal-form games, simple penal codes (Abreu 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. We provide two examples illustrating that a subgame-perfect outcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124002
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The Consistency of Optimal Policy in Stochastic Rational Expectations Models
Backus, David; Driffill, John - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1986
This paper extends the work of Barro and Gordon (1983) to general linear models with rational expectations. We examine the question whether the optimal policy rule, i.e. the one that a government which could pre-commit itself would use, can be sustained as a consistent rule in the sense defined...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504552
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Use of Banking Services in Emerging Markets--Household-Level Evidence
Beck, Thorsten; Brown, Martin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
This paper uses survey data for 60,000 households from 29 transition economies in 2006 and 2010 to explore how the use of banking services is related to household characteristics, as well as to bank ownership, deposit insurance and creditor protection. At the household level we find that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009205063
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Deposit Insurance and International Bank Deposits
Huizinga, Harry; Nicodème, Gaëtan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
This Paper examines how international depositors respond to national deposit insurance policies. Countries with explicit deposit insurance are found to be relatively attractive to international non-bank depositors. Schemes characterized by co-insurance, a private administration, and a low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662335
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The EU Deposit Insurance Directive: Does One Size Fit All?
Huizinga, Harry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
The EU deposit insurance directive requires member states to maintain deposit insurance with a minimum insured amount of 20,000 euros. This paper reviews the rationale for international coordination of deposit insurance policies. For international externalities of deposit insurance policies to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662400
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The Macroeconomics of Money Market Freezes
Bruche, Max; Suarez, Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
This paper develops a tractable general equilibrium model in which money markets provide structural funding to some banks. When bank default risk becomes significant, retail deposit insurance creates an asymmetry between banks that operate in savings-rich regions, which can remain financed at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991546
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Policies for Banking Crises: A Theoretical Framework
Repullo, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
guarantees, and provision of unrestricted liquidity support. In the context of a simple model of information-based bank runs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791329