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de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir; Knight, Brian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

. We take an implementation-theoretic approach and provide theoretical, empirical and experimental analyses of this problem …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399707

Budgeting versus implementing fiscal policy in the EU

Beetsma, Roel; Giuliodori, Massimo; Wierts, Peter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

implementation in the EU are determined. We find that (1) implemented budgetary adjustment falls systematically short of planned … by the implementation errors, (3) there is a limited role for "traditional" political variables, (4) stock … their implementation benefit from stronger national fiscal institutions. We emphasise also the importance of credible plans …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005041099

All-Pay Auctions: Implementation and Optimality

Jönsson, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper analyzes how all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes can be used to provide effort incentives. We show that wide classes of effort distributions can be implemented as equilibrium outcomes of such games. We also ask how all-pay auctions have to be structured so as to induce high...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084454

Participation Games: Market Entry, Coordination and the Beautiful Blonde

Anderson, Simon P; Engers, Maxim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We find the Nash equilibria for monotone n-player symmetric games where each player chooses whether to participate. Examples include market entry games, coordination games, and the bar-room game depicted in the movie 'A Beautiful Mind'. The symmetric Nash equilibrium involves excessive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662078

How Should Control Theory be Used by a Time-Consistent Government?

Cohen, Daniel; Michel, Philippe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1986

It has been recognized that the optimal strategy of a government is generally time-inconsistent: optimality requires that the government take into account expectations effects in the formulation of its policy and to ignore these effects when applying the policy. In order to analyse the problem,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666548

Regulation Games

Gilbert, Richard; Newbery, David M G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1988

We examine regulation as a repeated game between a regulator and a utility facing a Markovian sequence of demands. Sunk capital would be expropriated by a regulator concerned only with the short-run interests of consumers. There exist rate of return regulatory policies supporting efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792339

Price Stability as a Nash Equilibrium in Monetary Open-Economy Models

Benigno, Gianluca; Benigno, Pierpaolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

A two-country dynamic general-equilibrium model with imperfect competition and price stickiness is considered. This work shows the conditions under which price stability can implement the flexible-price allocation as a Nash equilibrium. This is possible if and only if both countries maintain a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136428

The Sustainability of Optimal Cooperative Macroeconomic Policies in a Two-Country World

Currie, David; Levine, Paul L - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1986

The paper investigates the sustainability of cooperative rules for the conduct of macroeconomic policy in a two-country world. The problem is set out as a supergame in which the threat strategy is to switch to a Nash non-cooperative equilibrium. A number of possible non-cooperative equilibria...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281334

Ramsey Monetary Policy and International Relative Prices

Faia, Ester; Monacelli, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

allows an accurate characterization of optimal policy in an economy that evolves around a steady state that is not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114306

Coordination of Capital Taxation Among Asymmetric Countries

Peralta, Susana; van Ypersele, Tanguy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper tackles the issue of international fiscal coordination in a world where markets are integrated but national governments are sovereign. The consequences of capital market liberalization to national fiscal policies and possible remedies to resulting inefficiencies are analysed. A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656387