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Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders: Do They Matter When Ownership Is Concentrated?
Hamdani, Assaf; Yafeh, Yishay - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
and business groups are prevalent. When companies have controlling shareholders, institutional investors, as minority … shareholders, can play only a limited role in corporate governance. Moreover, the presence of powerful families who control many … governance, what matters most is not the legal power granted to minority shareholders but rather the absence of conflicts of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554240
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Why is hedge fund activism procyclical?
Burkart, Mike; Dasgupta, Amil - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
for shareholders and bondholders. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084491
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Liquidity and Governance
Back, Kerry E.; Li, Tao; Ljungqvist, Alexander P. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
Is greater trading liquidity good or bad for corporate governance? We address this question both theoretically and empirically. We solve a model consisting of an optimal IPO followed by a dynamic Kyle market in which the large investor's private information concerns her own plans for taking an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084717
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The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study
Becht, Marco; Franks, Julian R; Grant, Jeremy; Wagner, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
This paper provides evidence that returns to hedge fund activism are driven by engagement outcomes. We use a sample of 1,740 activist engagements from 23 countries to estimate performance of activism across North America, Europe and Asia. Striking differences emerge across countries in outcomes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011207399
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Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Cohen, Alma - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
viewed as detrimental to shareholders. We also find that there is commonly a big difference between a state's ability to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123946
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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
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Ambiguity, Disagreement, and Allocation of Control in Firms
Dicks, David L.; Fulghieri, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
aversion generates endogenous disagreement between a firm's insider and outside shareholders, creating a new rationale for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213312
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Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation
Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock-based incentives elicit not only productive effort, but also costly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567
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Delegated Activism and Disclosure
Dasgupta, Amil; Zachariadis, Konstantinos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
Mutual funds are significant blockholders in many corporations. Concerns that funds vote in a pro-management manner to garner lucrative pensions contracts led the SEC to mandate the disclosure of proxy votes. We present a model of mutual fund voting in the presence of potential business ties. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321841