uncovers new effects. First, exclusive deals can be used to improve the incumbent’s bargaining position in the merger … installing new capacity. Third, exclusive dealing reduces welfare because (i) it may trigger entry through merger whereas de novo …

We estimate the deterrence effects of U.S. merger policy instruments with respect to the composition and frequency of … future merger notifications. Data from the Annual Reports by the U.S. DOJ and FTC allow industry based measures over the 1986 … challenge-rate to robustly deter future horizontal (both relative and absolute) merger activity; the investigation-rate to …

, and Monitorings – to deter firms from engaging in mergers. We employ cross-jurisdiction/pan-time data on merger policy to … empirically estimate the impact of antitrust actions on future merger frequencies. We find merger prohibitions to lead to …Antitrust policy involves not just the regulation of anti-competitive behavior, but also an important deterrence effect …

We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger …-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an … antitrust authority. Although the information improves upon the quality of the authority’s decision, the influence activities …

We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying … changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has … strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential …

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature …

In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some …