instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

We provide evidence on the match between firms, managers and incentives using a new survey designed for this purpose … managers are heterogeneous. Following the sources of heterogeneity observed in the data, we assume that firms differ by … than non-family firms. Managers differ in their degree of risk aversion and talent. The entry of firms and managers, the …

We examine the relationship between the employment and compensation of managers and CEOs and the presence of a … monitoring, which requires more managers. The model also assumes rent sharing between workers, managers and the owners of the … firm. Unions, by redistributing rents towards the workers, lead to lower employment and lower pay for managers. Using a …

based on a matching procedure. Only 7% of top-level Czech managers are women and their wages are about 20 percent lower even …

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

should err in favour of the arrangement that is less favourable to managers. Such an approach, we show, would make it most …

This paper investigates whether the arrival of managers with export experience, i.e. experience acquired through … relationship is of a causal nature. We construct a worker-firm matched panel dataset which enables us to track managers across …. Contrary to blue and white collars, we find that managers are paid a sizeable premium for export experience which has both a …