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A Multi-Task Theory of the State Enterprise Reform

Bai, Chong-En; Li, David Daokui; Tao, Zhigang; Wang, Yijiang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

During transition, maintaining employment and providing a social safety net for the unemployed are important to social stability, which in turn is crucial for the productivity of the whole economy. Because independent institutions for social safety are lacking and firms with strong profit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504537

Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance?

Berg, Erlend; Ghatak, Maitreesh; Manjula, R; Rajasekhar, D - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance in the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives, but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145477

Privatization and Quality: Evidence from Elderly Care in Sweden

Bergman, Mats; Johansson, Per; Lundberg, Sofia; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Non-contractible quality dimensions are at risk of degradation when the provision of public services is privatized. However, privatization may increase quality by fostering performance-improving innovation, particularly if combined with increased competition. We assemble a large data set on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084097

Resisting Migration: Wage Rigidity and Income Distribution

Razin, Assaf; Sadka, Efraim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

Like any trade activity, migration tends to generate gains to all parties involved - the migrants as well as the native-born population. With a mal-functioning labour market, however, migration will exacerbate the imperfections in the market. Consequently, it may lead to losses to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498173

The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector

Gagnepain, Philippe; Ivaldi, Marc; Martimort, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

The renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts. However, assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question, we fit a structural...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008684689

Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena

Gersbach, Hans; Uhlig, Harald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

lenders, which may make lending altogether unprofitable. Second, banks can have an incentive to offer a debt contract and … additional equity contracts to intermediate debtors, which is in turn dominated by a simple debt contract, only attractive for … seek to avoid the contract with the highest chance of delivery: that contract attracts all bad entrepreneurs. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661861

On the Global Supply of Basic Research

Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

In a two-country Schumpeterian growth model, we study the incentives for basic research investments by governments in a globalized world. We find that a country's basic research investments increase with the country's level of human capital and decline with its own market size. This may explain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145469

Making Democracy Work: Culture, Social Capital and Elections in China

Padró i Miquel, Gerard; Qian, Nancy; Xu, Yiqing; Yao, Yang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

This paper aims to show that culture is an important determinant of the effectiveness of formal democratic institutions, such as elections. We collect new data to document the presence of voluntary and social organizations and the history of electoral reforms in Chinese villages. We use the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213313

Diversity and the Power of the Elites in Democratic Societies: A model and a test.

Bandiera, Oriana; Levy, Gilat - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper analyzes whether political outcomes in local democracies are determined by the preferences of the median -typically poor- agents or whether they reflect the wishes of the wealthy elites. A model shows that when politicians belonging to different groups can form coalitions, the wealthy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008611020

Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability? Evidence from Rural China

Martinez-Bravo, Monica; Padró i Miquel, Gerard; Qian, Nancy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We use unique survey data to study whether the introduction of local elections in China made local leaders more accountable towards local constituents. We develop a simple model to predict the effects on different policies of increasing local leader accountability, taking into account that there...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009001062