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Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?

Barros, Pedro Pita; Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

consider how this relationship performs in the presence of institutional biases and lobbying efforts. It is found that the best … higher, and decisions are less vulnerable to lobbying. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662069

A Political Economy Model of Infrastructure Allocation: An Empirical Assessment

Cadot, Olivier; Röller, Lars-Hendrik; Stephan, Andreas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model explicitly the political-economy process driving infrastructure investments; in doing so, we eliminate a potential source of bias in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666545

Special Interest Politics and Aid Fungibility

Lahiri, Sajal; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

We develop a political-economic model of aid fungibility. A donor country gives aid to a recipient government for the benefit of a target group. However, the recipient government accepts political contributions from a lobby group not targeted by the donor and transfers a fraction of the aid to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667087

How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy

List, John; Sturm, Daniel M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

popular view that choices on secondary policy instruments are largely determined by lobbying, we find strong effects of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789133

Safety Nets Within Banks

Felgenhauer, Mike; Grüner, Hans Peter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study how banks should protect their credit departments against the external influence from potential borrowers. We analyze four mechanisms that are widespread in practice: a credit board with unanimity or simple majority, a hierarchy and an advisory system. A bank faces a trade-off between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791309

A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements

Maggi, Giovanni; Rodriguez-Clare, Andres - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We develop a model where trade agreements - in addition to correcting terms-of-trade externalities - help governments to commit vis-a-vis domestic industrial lobbies. We explore how trade liberalization is affected by the characteristics of the political environment, such as the degree to which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791399

Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence

Campos, Nauro F; Giovannoni, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and … theoretical framework that focus on the relationship between lobbying and corruption (that is, it investigates under what … conditions they are complements or substitutes). The paper also offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792187

Political Activism, Trust, and Coordination

Battaglini, Marco; Bénabou, Roland - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

maker does not react unless all of them are actively lobbying. In a ‘mutual discipline’ or high-trust equilibrium, by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792452

Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation

Frisell, Lars; Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policy-maker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truth telling, we show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792547

Joint Ventures as a Commitment Device Against Lobbies

Berardi, Nicoletta; Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

lobbying pressure are more likely than other firms to choose joint ventures as their corporate governance structure. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468544