The paper analyses tax and tariff policy for trade between economies which each contain a monopolistically competitive industry producing differentiated products. The consequences of tax changes by a single country are examined, and the general desirability of taxing imports more heavily than...

We consider the impact of taxation when investors face a discrete choice between two or more mutually exclusive projects; in particular we consider the location choice of multinationals. Such choices depend on an effective average tax rate. We propose a precise measure of this rate, which is...

This paper sheds new light on why timing and entry mode should be considered simultaneously. We derive the profit levels at which it is optimal to switch from exporting to setting up a wholly owned subsidiary, creating a joint venture, or licensing production to a local firm. The preferred entry...

We develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with non-transferable utility, and prove that the principals’ Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action. We apply this theory to construct a positive model of public finance,...

We extend "economic equivalence" results, like the Ricardian equivalence proposition, to the political sphere where policy is chosen sequentially. We derive conditions under which a policy regime (summarizing admissible policy choices in every period) and a state are "politico-economically...

We develop a framework for optimal taxation when agents can earn their income both in traditional activities, where private and social products coincide, and in rent-seeking activities, where private returns exceed social returns either because they involve the capture of pre-existing rents or...

Should privately informed agents with diverging interests act independently or should they commit to a mechanism? This paper analyzes different communication and decision protocols when communication involves delay. It studies under which conditions agents should (i) choose their actions...