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Asker, John; Cantillon, Estelle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of non monetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behaviour...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497976

On the Uniqueness of Optimal Prices Set by Monopolistic Sellers

den Berg, Gerard J van - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper considers price determination by monopolistic sellers who know the distribution of valuations among the potential buyers. We derive a novel condition under which the optimal price set by the monopolist is unique. In many settings, this condition is easy to interpret, and it is valid...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789129

How to Win a Decision in a Confederation

Jehiel, Philippe; Thisse, Jacques-François - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper deals with collective decision making within a group of independent jurisdictions. The right to choose the public policy is delegated from the central authority of one of the jurisdictions through a bidding procedure among the group members. We identify the following trade-off:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661614

The Impact of the Droit de Suite in the UK: An Empirical Analysis

Banternghansa, Chanont; Graddy, Kathryn - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

changes in the UK auction market for art that is subject to the Droit de Suite (DDS), relative to changes for art not subject … to the DDS, and also relative to changes in the auction markets for art in countries where there has been no change in … impact on the UK art auction market. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662156

Mixed Bundling Auctions

Jehiel, Philippe; Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moritz; Moldovanu, Benny - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single … objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667050

The Winner's Curse and the Failure of the Law of Demand

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

We usually assume increases in supply, allocation by rationing, and exclusion of potential buyers will never raise prices. But all of these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common-value assets are sold. Furthermore, when we make the assumptions needed to rule...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114197

What Really Matters in Auction Design

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive … discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles), and the Anglo-Dutch auction … of the context; the circumstances of the recent UK mobile-phone license auction made an ascending format ideal. We also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114514

Using and Abusing Economic Theory

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

Economic theory is often abused in practical policy-making. There is frequently excessive focus on sophisticated theory at the expense of elementary theory; too much economic knowledge can sometimes be a dangerous thing. Too little attention is paid to the wider economic context, and to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498003

Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices

Roider, Andreas; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

valuations. We show that the experimental evidence can be explained by a simple extension of the standard auction model, where …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498113

Almost Common Value Auctions: The 'Wallet Game' and its Applications to Takeover Battles and Airwaves Auctions

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

We use a classroom game, the ‘Wallet Game’, to show that in standard ascending, i.e. English, auctions of close-to-common-values objects, even slight asymmetries between bidders can have very large effects on prices. Examples of small asymmetries are a small value advantage for one bidder or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791269