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Voucher Privatization, Corporate Control and the Cost of Capital: An Analysis of the Czech Privatization Programme
Marcincin, Anton; van Wijnbergen, Sweder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995
Voucher privatization programmes have been criticized for leading to excessively dispersed ownership and hence failure of control and insufficient corporate governance. We analyse the results of the five auction rounds of the Czech privatization programme and subsequent stock market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123768
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Equity Block Transfers in Transition Economies: Evidence from Poland
Trojanowski, Grzegorz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper investigates valuation effects of share block transfers and employs agency theory to explain the determinants of block premia. A sample of transactions from Poland is used to measure benefits and costs of ownership concentration. Block premia are found to be substantially lower than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124379
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Corporate Governance Externalities
Acharya, Viral V; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We argue that the choice of corporate governance by a firm affects and is affected by the choice of governance by other firms. Firms with weaker governance give higher payoffs to their management to incentivize them. This forces firms with good governance to also pay their management more than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136630
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Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection
Burkart, Mike; Panunzi, Fausto - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
This Paper analyses the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, and ownership concentration. In our framework, blockholder and manager are distinct parties and the presence of a blockholder can both protect and hurt minority shareholders. Legal shareholder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662105
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On the Long Run Evolution of Inheritance - France 1820-2050*
Piketty, Thomas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
1950, and back up to about 15% by 2010. A simple theoretical model of wealth accumulation, growth and inheritance can fully … wealth and inheritance are bound to play a key role for aggregate wealth accumulation and the structure of lifetime …This paper attempts to document and account for the long run evolution of inheritance. We find that in a country like …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468507
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Sequencing regionalism: Theory, European practice, and lessons for Asia
Baldwin, Richard - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
Feedback mechanisms are the key to sequencing when it comes to regional integration. Feedback mechanisms can mean that today’s policy or institution alters the political economy landscape in a way that makes it politically optimal for future governments to take further steps towards...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468652
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A Theory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation
Piketty, Thomas; Saez, Emmanuel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
This paper derives optimal inheritance tax formulas that (a) capture the key equity-efficiency trade-off, (b) are … but realistic linear or two-bracket tax structures to obtain tractable formulas. We show that long-run optimal inheritance …-Becker dynastic model. In all cases, the optimal inheritance tax rate increases with the concentration of bequest received and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083680
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Corporate Governance
Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
The paper first develops an economic analysis of the concept of shareholder value, describes its approach and discusses some open questions. It emphasizes the relationship between pledgeable income, monitoring and control rights using a unifying and simple framework. The paper then provides a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666704
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Ambiguity, Disagreement, and Allocation of Control in Firms
Dicks, David L.; Fulghieri, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
We present a novel source of disagreement grounded in decision theory: ambiguity aversion. We show that ambiguity aversion generates endogenous disagreement between a firm's insider and outside shareholders, creating a new rationale for corporate governance systems. In our paper, optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213312
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Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation
Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock-based incentives elicit not only productive effort, but also costly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567