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Protecting Minorities in Binary Elections. A Test of Storable Votes Using Field Data

Casella, Alessandra; Ehrenberg, Shuky; Gelman, Andrew; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Democratic systems are built, with good reason, on majoritarian principles, but their legitimacy requires the protection of strongly held minority preferences. The challenge is to do so while treating every voter equally and preserving aggregate welfare. One possible solution is storable votes:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662342

Who is in Favour of Enlargement? Determinants of Support for EU Membership in the Candidate Countries Referenda

Doyle, Orla; Fidrmuc, Jan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

membership, using regional referendum results and individual survey data on voting intentions. We find that favourable individual …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666521

Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?

Barros, Pedro Pita; Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

consider how this relationship performs in the presence of institutional biases and lobbying efforts. It is found that the best … higher, and decisions are less vulnerable to lobbying. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662069

A Political Economy Model of Infrastructure Allocation: An Empirical Assessment

Cadot, Olivier; Röller, Lars-Hendrik; Stephan, Andreas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model explicitly the political-economy process driving infrastructure investments; in doing so, we eliminate a potential source of bias in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666545

Special Interest Politics and Aid Fungibility

Lahiri, Sajal; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

We develop a political-economic model of aid fungibility. A donor country gives aid to a recipient government for the benefit of a target group. However, the recipient government accepts political contributions from a lobby group not targeted by the donor and transfers a fraction of the aid to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667087

How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy

List, John; Sturm, Daniel M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

popular view that choices on secondary policy instruments are largely determined by lobbying, we find strong effects of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789133

Safety Nets Within Banks

Felgenhauer, Mike; Grüner, Hans Peter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study how banks should protect their credit departments against the external influence from potential borrowers. We analyze four mechanisms that are widespread in practice: a credit board with unanimity or simple majority, a hierarchy and an advisory system. A bank faces a trade-off between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791309

A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements

Maggi, Giovanni; Rodriguez-Clare, Andres - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We develop a model where trade agreements - in addition to correcting terms-of-trade externalities - help governments to commit vis-a-vis domestic industrial lobbies. We explore how trade liberalization is affected by the characteristics of the political environment, such as the degree to which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791399

Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence

Campos, Nauro F; Giovannoni, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and … theoretical framework that focus on the relationship between lobbying and corruption (that is, it investigates under what … conditions they are complements or substitutes). The paper also offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792187

Political Activism, Trust, and Coordination

Battaglini, Marco; Bénabou, Roland - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

maker does not react unless all of them are actively lobbying. In a ‘mutual discipline’ or high-trust equilibrium, by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792452