We examine strategic information transmission in a controlled laboratory experiment of a cheap talk game with one … with just one receiver, information transmission is higher in games with a separating equilibrium, than in games with only … communication between the sender and the receiver in a way consistent with the theoretical predictions. Deviations from the …

e±ciently, the integrated firm's top management must obtain information about the possible use of resources from … performance can establish truthful upward communication, but creates a free-rider problem and raises the cost of inducing effort …. This effect exists even though with perfect information, centralized resource allocation would improve the managers …

We study strategic information transmission in a Sender-Receiver game where players' optimal actions depend on the … posterior means. The existence of smooth communication equilibria depends on the relative usefulness of the signal structure to … Sender and Receiver, respectively. We characterize extensive forms in which the quality of information is optimally designed …

rarely fight one another. We show that in the presence of information asymmetries and strategic complements, the strategic …

.S. imports of intermediate goods. We develop a model in which firms influence the government by transmitting information about …

endogeneity of the agenda gives rise to a cheap talk game, where the chair can use the order of proposals to transmit information … about his priorities. The game has multiple equilibria, differing systematically in the precision of the information …

supervisors are asymmetrically informed and exchange information through ’cheap talk’. It is assumed that they consider domestic …

coordinated with each other. Information about local conditions is dispersed and held by self-interested division managers who … for coordination improves horizontal communication but worsens vertical communication. As a result, no matter how …