whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices …: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels …. With rewards, cartels are reported systematically and prices finally fall. If a ringleader is excluded from leniency …

The paper reviews the recent evolution of leniency programs for cartels in the US and EU, surveys their theoretical … fraud, or corruption - that share with cartels the crucial features that well designed leniency and whistleblower programs …

We develop a general economic framework for computing cartel damages claims. We decompose a direct purchaser plaintiff …'s lost profits from the cartel in three parts: the anticompetitive price overcharge (or cost effect), the pass-on effect and … of circumstances, provided that suficiently many of the plaintiff's rivals are affected by the cartel. We derive exact …

manufacturing following the abolition of cartels using a theoretical framework based on Sutton's theory of market structure and a …

Many convicted cartels have a leader which is substantially larger than its rivals. In a setting where firms face … structures since this enables the merged firm to cover the indivisible cost associated with cartel leadership; and (ii …

We review current methods for calculating fines against cartels in the US and EU, and simulate their deterrence effects … of cartel deterrence, but the firms’ limited ability to pay does not appear any longer such a strong argument for their …

’ punishment; and (c) increasing the riskiness of taking part to a cartel. …Leniency programmes (or policies) reduce sanctions against cartel members that self-report to the Antitrust Authority …. We focus on their ability to directly deter cartels and analogous criminal organizations by undermining internal trust …