The best predictor of current investment at the firm level is lagged investment. This lagged-investment effect is empirically more important than the cash-flow and Q effects combined. We show that the specification of investment adjustment costs proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans...

This paper analyzes why corporate governance matters for stock returns if the stock market prices the underlying managerial agency problem correctly. Our theory assumes that strict corporate governance prevents managers from diverting cash flows, but reduces incentives for managerial effort. In...

Which investment model best fits firm-level data? To answer this question we estimate alternative models using Compustat data. Surprisingly, the two best-performing specifications are based on Hayashi's (1982) model. This model's foremost implication, that Q is a sufficient statistic for...

Using a unique data set from the Czech Republic for 1994-2003, this study examines the relationship between a firm’s liquidity constraints and its supply linkages with multinational corporations (MNCs). The empirical analysis indicates that Czech firms supplying MNCs are less credit...

Value and momentum portfolios exhibit strong opposite signed exposure to an aggregate risk factor based on low frequency fluctuations in the capital share. This strong opposite signed exposure helps explain why both strategies earn high average returns yet are negatively correlated. But the...

Investors are keenly interested in financial reports of earnings because earnings provide important information for investment decisions. Thus, executives who are monitored by investors and directors face strong incentives to manage earnings. We introduce consideration of...

Empirical evidence suggests that the distribution of earnings reports exhibits kinks. Managers manage earnings as if to meet exogenously pre-specified targets, such as avoiding losses and avoiding a decrease in earnings. This is puzzling because the compensation to managers at these...

I characterize the effects of empirically observed managerial incentives on long-run oligopolistic competition. When managers have a preference for smooth time-paths of profits – as revealed by the empirical literature on ‘income smoothing’ – manager-led firms can sustain collusive...

The collapse of the CMEA completed the Hungarian trade reorientation during the second half of the 1980s. Panel model estimations of trade reorientation reveal that cost efficiency, export subsidy and foreign demand played important and varying roles between 1981 and 1990. During the last two...

We study the pricing of political uncertainty in a general equilibrium model of government policy choice. We find that political uncertainty commands a risk premium whose magnitude is larger in poorer economic conditions. Political uncertainty reduces the value of the implicit put protection...