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On the Uniqueness of Optimal Prices Set by Monopolistic Sellers
den Berg, Gerard J van - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
This paper considers price determination by monopolistic sellers who know the distribution of valuations among the potential buyers. We derive a novel condition under which the optimal price set by the monopolist is unique. In many settings, this condition is easy to interpret, and it is valid...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789129
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Advance-Purchase Discounts as a Price Discrimination Device
Nocke, Volker; Peitz, Martin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
In an intertemporal setting in which individual uncertainty is resolved over time, advance-purchase discounts can serve to price discriminate between consumers with different expected valuations for the same product. Consumers with a high expected valuation purchase the product before learning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123763
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Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies
Emons, Winand - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997
imperfect tests to find out about buildings’ damage types. The insurance market is a natural monopoly. If more than one insurer …. First we show that the natural insurance monopoly need not be sustainable. Then we show that in the equilibrium industry … structure the incumbent may accommodate entry even when the natural monopoly is sustainable. The theoretical findings are thus …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123854
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Distribution & Growth in an Economy with Limited Needs
Saint-Paul, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
increases utility. It is assumed that each variety is owned by a monopoly. Workers can specialise in material goods production … their bliss point can only be made better off by an increase in diversity. If wages are set by monopoly unions rather than …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124380
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Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects
Farrell, Joseph; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
, it later 'tips' to monopoly, after which entry is hard, often even too hard given incompatibility. And while switching …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124423
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Selling to Consumers with Endogenous Types
Boone, Jan; Shapiro, Joel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
For many goods (such as experience goods or addictive goods), consumers' preferences may change over time. In this paper, we examine a monopolist's optimal pricing schedule when current consumption can affect a consumer's valuation in the future and valuations are unobservable. We assume that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497874
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Foreclosure with Incomplete Information
White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
upstream monopolist to limit output to monopoly levels, whereas a disintegrated structure will ‘over-sell’, producing more in … is, supply less than their monopoly output. Low-cost firms continue to over-sell, so all types of firms have a reason to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498007
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The design and efficiency of loyalty rewards
Caminal, Ramon - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
The goal of this paper is to reexamine the optimal design and efficiency of loyalty rewards in markets for final consumption goods. While the literature has emphasized the role of loyalty rewards as endogenous switching costs (which distort the efficient allocation of consumers), in this paper I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008458297
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Speculative Contracts
Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
We propose to view action-contingent contracts as bets, motivated by different prior beliefs between the contracting parties (rather than, say, as an instrument for overcoming moral hazard problems). Such differences in prior beliefs may arise from inherent biases such as over-optimism. Menus of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666429
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Insisting on a Non-negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare and Multiple Equilibria
Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
I study Cournot competition under incomplete information about demand while assuming that market price must be non-negative for all demand realizations. Although this assumption is very natural, it has only rarely been made in the earlier literature. Yet it has important economic consequences:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656447