the incidence of conflict to circumstances, institutions and features of the underlying economy and polity. We use this … model to derive testable predictions and to interpret the cross-sectional and times-series variations in civil conflict. Our … most novel empirical finding is that higher world market prices of exported, as well as imported, commodities are strong …

Government corruption is more prevalent in poor countries than in rich countries. This paper uses cross …-industry heterogeneity in growth rates within Vietnam to test empirically whether growth leads to lower corruption. We find that it does. We … results suggest that as poor countries grow, corruption could subside …

all world leaders from 1875 to 2004, we exploit inherent randomness in the success or failure of assassination attempts to … contemporary source of institutional change, inform theories of conflict, and show that small sources of randomness can have a …

The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of … implications of the theory and identify the causal effect of larger federal transfers on political corruption and the observed … transfers increase political corruption and reduce the quality of candidates for mayor. …

. We show that corruption opportunities are lower under centralization at each period of time. However, centralization … makes more difficult for citizens to detect corrupt incumbents. Thus, corruption is easier under centralization for low …

We study the emergence and interaction of red tape and corruption in a principal-bureaucrat-agent hierarchy. The … the social optimum if the bureaucrat in charge of red tape is corrupt. We consider two types of corruption. First, the … bribes to conceal the information produced through red tape. The former kind of corruption tends to reduce red tape, while …

enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is …

and decreasing in officials' corruption. In contrast to the "tollbooth view" of regulation, the standard chosen by a self …-interested government is a non-monotonic function of officials' corruption, and can be either lower or higher than that chosen by a …-capita income, and negatively with corruption, consistently with the model's predictions for benevolent governments …