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Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers

Burkart, Mike; Raff, Konrad - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by offering acquisition opportunities to successful … performance-based pay are non-monotonic in the intensity of the takeover threat. In firms with weak boards, turnover (performance …-based pay) increases (decreases) with the intensity of the takeover threat. When choosing its acquisition policy and the quality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083799

Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Risk: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Albuquerque, Rui; Durnev, Artyom; Koskinen, Yrjö - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper presents an industry equilibrium model where firms can choose to engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. We model CSR activities as an investment in customer loyalty and show that CSR decreases systematic risk and increases firm value. These effects are stronger...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083749

The Choice of Honesty: An Experiment Regarding Heterogeneous Responses to Situational Social Norms

Gibson, Rajna; Tanner, Carmen; Wagner, Alexander F - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We conduct a laboratory experiment in which we expose participants to situational social norms of approval or disapproval of lying. While participants on average conform to the situational pressure, the results highlight important differences in individual reactions. Situational norms crowd out...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145452

Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing?

Bruno, Valentina; Claessens, Stijn - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

For a large number of companies from different countries, we analyze how company corporate governance practices and country regulatory regimes interact in terms of company valuation. We confirm that corporate governance plays a crucial role in efficient company monitoring and shareholder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504236

Rhineland exit?

Bovenberg, A Lans; Teulings, Coen N - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We argue in favour of the shareholder model of the firm for three main reasons, First, serving multiple stakeholders leads to ill-defined property rights. What sounds like a fair compromise between stakeholders can easily evolve in a permanent struggle between the stakeholders about the ultimate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504292

Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment

Cespa, Giovanni; Cestone, Giacinta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

When stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, relations with social activists may become an effective entrenchment strategy for inefficient CEOs. We thus argue that managerial turnover and firm value are increased by the institutionalization of stakeholder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504332

A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Hochberg, Yael; Sapienza, Paola; Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We evaluate the net benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for shareholders by studying the lobbying behaviour of investors and corporate insiders to affect the final implemented rules under the Act. Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favour of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504338

Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers

Cornelli, Francesca; Li, David Daokui - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

The paper studies the role of risk arbitrage in takeover contests. We show that arbitrageurs have an incentive to … accumulate non-trivial stakes in a company target of a takeover. For each arbitrageur, the knowledge of his own presence (and … between trading volume, takeover premium, bidder's toehold, liquidity of the shares and the probability that the takeover will …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504384

Active Agents, Passive Principals: Does High-Powered CEO Compensation Really Improve Incentives

Dow, James; Raposo, Clara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

In this Paper we use agency theory to study the active role of the CEO in the formulation of corporate strategy. We allow the agent (CEO) to play a role in defining the parameters of the agency problem, in an incomplete contracting model in which the agent can be rewarded based only on financial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504388

Multiple Lenders and Corporate Distress: Evidence on Debt Restructuring

Brunner, Antje; Krahnen, Jan Pieter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

In the recent theoretical literature on lending risk, the common pool problem in multi-bank relationships has been analysed extensively. In this Paper we address this topic empirically, relying on a unique panel dataset that includes detailed credit-fie information on distressed lending...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504452