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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
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Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Cohen, Alma - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper empirically investigates the decisions of US publicly traded firms on where to incorporate. We study the features of states that make them attractive to incorporating firms and the characteristics of firms that determine whether they incorporate in or out of their state of location....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123946
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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
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The Political Economy of Corporate Governance
Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
The Paper analyses the political decision that determines the degree of investor protection. We show that entrepreneurs and workers can strike a political agreement by which low investor protection is exchanged for high employment protection. This ‘corporatist’ agreement is feasible if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666907
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Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Development and Politics
Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
This paper presents a political economy model where there is mutual feedback between investor protection and stock market development. Better investor protection induces companies to issue more equity and thereby leads to a broader stock market. In turn, equity issuance expands the shareholder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789093
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Corporate Fraud, Governance and Auditing
Immordino, Giovanni; Pagano, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We analyze corporate fraud in a model in which managers have superior information but are biased against liquidation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792136
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Law and Equity Markets: A Simple Model
Lombardo, Davide; Pagano, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
We analyze how the law and its enforcement affect equity market equilibrium. Improvements in the legal system, while invariably associated with broader equity markets, have different effects on equity returns depending on the institutional change considered and on the degree of international...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792541
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Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders: Do They Matter When Ownership Is Concentrated?
Hamdani, Assaf; Yafeh, Yishay - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We shed new light on the corporate governance role of institutional investors in markets where concentrated ownership and business groups are prevalent. When companies have controlling shareholders, institutional investors, as minority shareholders, can play only a limited role in corporate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554240
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Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter?
Cornelli, Francesca; Kominek, Zbigniew; Ljungqvist, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008491717
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Legal Determinants of the Return on Equity
Lombardo, Davide; Pagano, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
Recent work documents that better legal institutions are associated with broader equity markets. We investigate whether international differences in legal institutions also help explain the international cross-section of expected stock returns. We document three main regularities. First, total...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123538