We shed new light on the corporate governance role of institutional investors in markets where concentrated ownership and business groups are prevalent. When companies have controlling shareholders, institutional investors, as minority shareholders, can play only a limited role in corporate...

This Paper evaluates the primary mechanisms for changing management or obtaining control in publicly traded corporations with dispersed ownership. Specifically, we analyse and compare three mechanisms: (1) proxy fights (voting only); (2) takeover bids (buying shares only); and (3) a combination...

This Paper empirically investigates the decisions of US publicly traded firms on where to incorporate. We study the features of states that make them attractive to incorporating firms and the characteristics of firms that determine whether they incorporate in or out of their state of location....

Based on 412 control transactions between 1990 and 2000 we construct a measure of the private benefits of control in 39 countries. We find that the value of control ranges between –4% and +65%, with an average of 14%. As predicted by theory, in countries where private benefits of control are...

This Paper argues that once undistorted shareholder choice is ensured – which can be done by making it necessary for hostile bidders to win a vote of shareholder support – boards should not have veto power over takeover bids. The Paper considers all of the arguments that have been offered...

This Paper develops a model of the competition among states in providing corporate law rules. The analysis provides a full characterization of the equilibrium in this market. Competition among states is shown to produce optimal rules with respect to issues that do not have a substantial effect...

In a recent article, we have put forward a new approach to takeover law and regulatory competition. We proposed a ‘choice-enhancing’ federal intervention that would provide: (i) an optional body of substantive federal takeover law which shareholders would be able to opt into (or out of) and...

We consider the strategic timing of information releases in a dynamic disclosure model. Because investors don’t know whether or when the firm is informed, the firm will not necessarily disclose immediately. We show that bad market news can trigger the immediate release of information by firms....

The rise of social media has encouraged guru dreams because of the low entry barrier and highly skewed distribution of public attention that characterize social media. The pursuit of guru status, however, may be achieved through information provision or cheap talk, and competition inherent to...