We develop a model of banking competition which allows us to disentangle the roles that limited liability, deposit insurance (both with flat and risk-based premia), and rivalry for deposits play in determining risk-taking incentives both in the asset and the liability side of the balance sheet....

This paper studies the strategic interaction between a bank whose deposits are randomly withdrawn, and a lender of last resort (LLR) that bases its decision on supervisory information on the quality of the bank’s assets. The bank is subject to a capital requirement and chooses the liquidity...

Although it is widely accepted that financial development is associated with higher growth, the evidence on the channels through which credit affects growth at the microeconomic level is scant. Using data from a cross section of Bulgarian firms, we estimate the impact of access to credit, as...

In this paper the experience of deregulation in the banking sector of seven EC countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK) is analysed. Lessons are drawn for assessment of how the EC directives affecting this sector could further affect the industry. Our...

We examine the interdependency between loan officer compensation contracts and commercial bank internal reporting systems (IRSs). The optimal incentive contract for bank loan officers may require the bank headquarters to commit not to act on certain types of information. The headquarters can...

We investigate the nature of monitoring by stake holders using data on Japanese manufacturing firms. Shareholders and bank-centred corporate groups monitor firms by reducing activities with scope for managerial moral hazard such as advertising, R&D and entertainment expenses. Monitoring of this...

Credit market imperfections have been blamed for the depth and persistence of the Great Depression in the US. Could similar mechanisms have played a role in ending the East Asian miracle? After a brief account of the nature of the recent crises, we use Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) model of...

We present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously. Lenders' incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers, to the size of the credit market and to advances in information...

We analyse the implications for the pricing of bank loans of the reform of capital regulation known as Basel II. We consider a perfectly competitive market for business loans where, as in the model underlying the internal ratings based (IRB) approach of Basel II, a single risk factor explains...

This paper analyzes the consequences of bank diversification into fee-based businesses. Universal banks raise welfare by expanding the range of services available to entrepreneurs. However, because they may choose to rescue failed entrepreneurs in order to sell them fee-based financial services,...