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Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information

Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789071

Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

This is a preliminary draft of an Invited Symposium paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society to be held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and 'standard' economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792157

Investment Incentives and Auction Design in Electricity Markets

de Frutos, Maria-Angeles; Fabra, Natalia; Fehr, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Motivated by the regulatory debate in electricity markets, we seek to understand how market design affects market performance through its impact on investment incentives. For this purpose, we study a two-stage game in which firms choose their capacities under demand uncertainty prior to bidding...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656328

Properties of Scoring Auctions

Asker, John; Cantillon, Estelle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of non monetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behaviour...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497976

Multi-object Auctions: On the Use of Combinational Bids

Branco, Fernando - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

This paper studies multiple object auctions when there are two kinds of bidders: those interested in the bundle being sold (bundle bidders) and those that want one specific object only (unit bidders). The analysis has been motivated by the sale of spectrum rights in the United States.Using a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498027

License Auctions and Market Structure

Jehiel, Philippe; Moldovanu, Benny - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

We analyse the interplay between license auctions and market structure in a model with several incumbents and several potential entrants. The focus is on the competitiveness induced by the number of auctioned licences. Moreover, we study how the auction format affects the incentives for explicit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661756

Economic Reforms and Industrial Policy in a Panel of Chinese Cities

Alder, Simon; Shao, Lin; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We estimate the effect on economic development of China's industrial policy, in particular, the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZ). We use data from a panel of 276 Chinese cities and prefectures from 1988 to 2010. Our difference-in-difference estimator exploits the variation in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084232

Structural Reforms and Regional Convergence

Che, Natasha Xingyuan; Spilimbergo, Antonio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Which structural reforms affect the speed the regional convergence within a country? We found that domestic financial development, trade/current account openness, better institutional infrastructure, and selected labor market reforms facilitate regional convergence. However, these reforms have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084335

The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector

Gagnepain, Philippe; Ivaldi, Marc; Martimort, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

The renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts. However, assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question, we fit a structural...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008684689

Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena

Gersbach, Hans; Uhlig, Harald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

lenders, which may make lending altogether unprofitable. Second, banks can have an incentive to offer a debt contract and … additional equity contracts to intermediate debtors, which is in turn dominated by a simple debt contract, only attractive for … seek to avoid the contract with the highest chance of delivery: that contract attracts all bad entrepreneurs. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661861

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