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Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Cohen, Alma - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
viewed as detrimental to shareholders. We also find that there is commonly a big difference between a state's ability to …, and takeover law. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123946
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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
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Corporate Governance
Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
The paper first develops an economic analysis of the concept of shareholder value, describes its approach and discusses some open questions. It emphasizes the relationship between pledgeable income, monitoring and control rights using a unifying and simple framework. The paper then provides a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666704
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Ambiguity, Disagreement, and Allocation of Control in Firms
Dicks, David L.; Fulghieri, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
aversion generates endogenous disagreement between a firm's insider and outside shareholders, creating a new rationale for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213312
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Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation
Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock-based incentives elicit not only productive effort, but also costly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567
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Delegated Activism and Disclosure
Dasgupta, Amil; Zachariadis, Konstantinos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
Mutual funds are significant blockholders in many corporations. Concerns that funds vote in a pro-management manner to garner lucrative pensions contracts led the SEC to mandate the disclosure of proxy votes. We present a model of mutual fund voting in the presence of potential business ties. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321841
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Large powerful shareholders and cash holding
Anderson, Ronald W.; Hamadi, Malika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We study the relationship between liquid asset holding and the pattern of share ownership and control structures within the firm. We explore these issues using a data set of Belgian firms that is particularly well suited to studying the institutions of control oriented finance. The data include...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005041096
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Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders: Do They Matter When Ownership Is Concentrated?
Hamdani, Assaf; Yafeh, Yishay - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
and business groups are prevalent. When companies have controlling shareholders, institutional investors, as minority … shareholders, can play only a limited role in corporate governance. Moreover, the presence of powerful families who control many … governance, what matters most is not the legal power granted to minority shareholders but rather the absence of conflicts of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554240
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Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter?
Cornelli, Francesca; Kominek, Zbigniew; Ljungqvist, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed ‘hard’ information about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008491717