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Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers

Burkart, Mike; Raff, Konrad - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by offering acquisition opportunities to successful … performance-based pay are non-monotonic in the intensity of the takeover threat. In firms with weak boards, turnover (performance …-based pay) increases (decreases) with the intensity of the takeover threat. When choosing its acquisition policy and the quality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083799

Effects of Acquisitions on Product and Process Innovation and R&D Performance

Cefis, Elena; Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

Using a game theoretical model on firms' simultaneous investments in product and process innovation, we deduct and empirically test hypotheses on the optimal R&D portfolio, investment, performance, and dynamic efficiency of R&D for acquisitions and in independently competing firms. We use...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123533

Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Hart, Oliver - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

) takeover bids (buying shares only); and (3) a combination of proxy fights and takeover bids in which shareholders vote on … to proxy fights alone but also to takeover bids alone. Finally, we show that, when acquisition offers are in the form of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123692

Investment Banks as Insiders and the Market for Corporate Control

Bodnaruk, Andriy; Massa, Massimo; Simonov, Andrei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We study holdings in M&A targets by financial conglomerates which affiliated investment banks advise the bidders. We show that advisors take positions in the targets before M&A announcements. These stakes are positively related to the probability of observing the bid and to the target premium....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123703

The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

hostile bidders to win a vote of shareholder support – boards should not have veto power over takeover bids. The Paper …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124408

Investment Liberalization - Who Benefits from Cross Border Mergers

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Investment liberalizing countries are often concerned that cross-border mergers & acquisitions might have an adverse effect on domestic firms and benefit multinational enterprises (MNEs). Given that domestic assets are sufficiently scarce, we identify a preemption effect and an asset...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136401

Shareholder Value Creation in European M&As

Campa, José Manuel; Hernando, Ignacio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper looks at the value generated to shareholders by the announcement of mergers and acquisitions involving firms in the European Union over the period 1998-2000. Cumulative abnormal shareholder returns due to the announcement of a merger reflect a revision of the expected value resulting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136651

Cross-Border Mergers & Acquisitions and the Role of Trade Costs

Görg, Holger; Hijzen, Alexander; Manchin, Miriam - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have increased dramatically over the last two decades. This paper analyses the role of trade costs in explaining the increase in the number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In particular, we distinguish horizontal and non-horizontal M&As and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067607

Globalization and Profitability of Cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper studies how the surplus generated by the globalization process is divided between MNEs and owners of domestic assets. We construct an oligopoly model where the equilibrium acquisition pattern, the acquisition price and firms' greenfield investments are endogenously determined....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498033

Bargaining in Mergers and Termination Fees

Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We model takeovers as a bargaining process and explain termination fees for, both, the target and the acquirer, subject to parties’ bargaining power and outside options. In equilibrium, termination fees are offered by firms with outside options in exchange for a greater share of merger...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498188