instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

particular, branches with more experienced managers were better able to respond to the new incentives. …

managerial incentives affect both the mean and dispersion of workers’ productivity through two channels. First, managers respond … increase. Second, managers select out the least able workers, implying that the mean increases but the dispersion may decrease … of worker productivity. Analysis of individual level productivity data shows that managers target their effort towards …

We present evidence on the effect of social connections between workers and managers on productivity in the workplace … workers managed. We find that when managers are paid fixed wages, they favor workers to whom they are socially connected …

-out perceptions makes it optimal for a welfare-maximizing regulator to impose caps on bank bonuses. In contrast, raising managers …