We shed new light on the corporate governance role of institutional investors in markets where concentrated ownership and business groups are prevalent. When companies have controlling shareholders, institutional investors, as minority shareholders, can play only a limited role in corporate...

The extent to which business groups ever existed in the United States and, if they did exist, the reasons for their disappearance are poorly understood. In this paper we use hitherto unexplored historical sources to construct a comprehensive data set to address this issue. We find that (1)...

Public corporations live in a dynamic and ever-changing business environment. This Paper examines how courts and legislators should choose default arrangements in the corporate area to address new circumstances. We show that the interests of the shareholders of existing companies would not be...

We study IPOs by focusing on the degree of portfolio diversification of the shareholders taking the company public. We argue that a less diversified shareholder has more to gain from taking the company public and would be more willing to accept a lower price for the sale of its shares, i.e....

Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium model with asymmetric information we show that although stock-based compensation causes managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any...

We develop a dynamic model of an order-driven market populated by discretionary liquidity traders. These traders must trade, yet can choose the type of order and are fully strategic in their decision. Traders differ in their impatience: less patient traders demand liquidity, more patient traders...

We develop a dynamic model of a market with two specialized sides: traders posting quotes ("market makers") and traders hitting quotes ("market takers"). Traders monitor the market to seize profit opportunities, generating high frequency liquidity cycles. Monitoring decisions by market-makers...

Empirical evidence suggests that the distribution of earnings reports exhibits kinks. Managers manage earnings as if to meet exogenously pre-specified targets, such as avoiding losses and avoiding a decrease in earnings. This is puzzling because the compensation to managers at these...

This Paper challenges the North and Weingast (1989) view that institutional reforms and better protection of property rights lead to economic growth through a reduction in interest rates, and that a mechanism of this type accounted for Britain’s ascendancy to economic supremacy. We show that,...

We investigate company additions to stock market indices over a six-year period in 39 developed and emerging markets around the world. For most markets, we find a post-inclusion increase in beta and an increase in the explanatory power of market returns (R2), reflecting increased comovement...