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The Strategic Determinants of U.S. Human Rights Reporting: Evidence from the Cold War

Qian, Nancy; Yanagizawa-Drott, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

This paper uses a country-level panel dataset to test the hypothesis that the United States biases its human rights reports of countries based on the latters’ strategic value. We use the difference between the U.S. State Department’s and Amnesty International’s reports as a measure of U.S....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789167

So Closed: Political Selection in Proportional Systems

Galasso, Vincenzo; Nannicini, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We analyze political selection in a closed list proportional system where parties have strong gate-keeping power, which they use as an instrument to pursue votes. Parties face a trade-off between selecting loyal candidates or experts, who are highly valued by the voters and thus increase the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213305

Preventing Economists' Capture

Zingales, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

The very same forces that induce economists to conclude that regulators are captured should lead us to conclude that the economic profession is captured as well. As evidence of this capture, I show that papers whose conclusions are pro-management are more likely to be published in economic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083614

A Theory of Political Entrenchment

Saint-Paul, Gilles; Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andrea - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We develop a theory of endogenous political entrenchment in a simple two-party dynamic model of income redistribution with probabilistic voting. A partially self-interested left-wing party may implement (entrenchment) policies reducing the income of its own constituency, the lower class, in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083893

The Political Economy of Financial Systems: Evidence from Suffrage Reforms in the Last Two Centuries

Degryse, Hans; Lambert, Thomas; Schwienbacher, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Initially, voting rights were limited to wealthy elites providing political support for stock markets. The franchise expansion induces the median voter to provide political support for banking development as this new electorate has lower financial holdings and benefits less from the uncertainty...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084251

Democracy Undone. Systematic Minority Advantage in Competitive Vote Markets

Casella, Alessandra; Turban, Sébastien - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. The choice is binary and the number of supporters of either alternative is known. We identify a sufficient condition guaranteeing the existence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084259

How Modern Dictators Survive: Cooptation, Censorship, Propaganda, and Repression

Guriev, Sergei; Treisman, Daniel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

infer it from signals inherent in their living standards, state propaganda, and messages sent by an informed elite via … in making convincing state propaganda, censoring independent media, co-opting the elite, or equipping police to repress … grow over time. Censorship and co-optation of the elite are substitutes, but both are complements of propaganda. Repression …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186613

Financial liberalization and democracy: The role of reform reversals

Campos, Nauro F; Coricelli, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

The relationship between economic and political liberalization has received a great deal of attention lately, yet the possibility of a non-linear relationship and the role of reversals remain largely neglected. Focusing on democratization and financial reform, this paper offers evidence for a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964420

Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence

Campos, Nauro F; Giovannoni, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and corruption the preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are understandably rare. This paper provides a theoretical framework that focus on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792187

Fiscal Centralization and the Political Process

Albornoz-Crespo, Facundo; Cabrales, Antonio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We study the dynamic support for fiscal decentralization in a political agency model from the perspective of a region. We show that corruption opportunities are lower under centralization at each period of time. However, centralization makes more difficult for citizens to detect corrupt...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468714

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