We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequality and political accountability undermine entry and financial development. Incumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potential entrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...

We examine deal-level data on private equity transactions in the UK initiated during the period 1996 to 2004 by mature private equity houses. We un-lever the deal-level equity return and adjust for (un-levered) return to quoted peers to extract a measure of "alpha" or abnormal performance of the...

In this Paper, we provide a novel rationale for credit ratings. The rationale that we propose is that credit ratings can serve as a coordinating mechanism in situations where multiple equilibria can obtain. We show that credit ratings provide a ‘focal point’ for firms and their investors. We...

We model the asset allocation decision of a stylized corporate defined benefit pension plan in the presence of hedgeable and unhedgeable risks. We assume that plan fiduciaries--who make the asset allocation decision--face non-linear payoffs linked to the plan’s funding status because of the...

We study the decisions of international asset managers to outsource portfolio management of their funds and we link these decisions to market integration. Using a structural model of selfselection, we endogenize the decision to outsource in a comprehensive sample of international mutual funds...

We study how debt market frictions constraining the ability to replace bank with bond financing during a tightening in bank credit supply affect corporate yield spreads. We document that more inflexible firms suffer bigger increases in bond yield spreads as bank credit supply tightens. Debt...