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Entrepreneurial Innovations, Competition and Competition Policy
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
product competition tends to increase the relative profitability of innovation for sale relative to entry. Increased … competition reduces entrants' and acquirers' profits in a similar fashion, but also reduces the profit of non-acquirers. Therefore …, incumbents' valuations of innovations are less negatively affected by increased competition than entrants' profits. This, in turn …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497863
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Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution
Motta, Massimo; Polo, Michele - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
We study the enforcement of competition policy against collusion under Leniency Programs, which give reduced fines to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661610
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Vertical Merger, Collusion, and Disruptive Buyers
Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
In a repeated game setting of a vertically related industry, we study the collusive effects of vertical mergers. We show that any vertical merger facilitates upstream collusion, no matter how large (in terms of capacity or size of product portfolio) the integrated downstream buyer. But a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468660
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Product Variety and Welfare under Discriminatory and Mill Pricing Policies
Norman, George; Thisse, Jacques-François - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1994
We re-examine the economic justification for the regulation of firms' spatial price policies. Existing analysis, by treating market structure as exogenous, loses an important trade-off. Discriminatory pricing is more competitive between incumbents but acts as a strong deterrent against entry....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136598
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Competition Among the Big and the Small
Shimomura, Ken-Ichi; Thisse, Jacques-François - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
Armchair evidence shows that many industries are made of a few big commercial or manufacturing firms, which are able to affect the market outcome, and of a myriad of small family-run businesses with very few employees, each of which has a negligible impact on the market. Examples can be found in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005048555
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Who Integrates?
Bühler, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
We examine vertical backward integration in oligopoly. Analysing a standard linear Cournot model, we find that for wide parameter ranges (i) some firms integrate, while others remain separated, and (ii) efficient firms are more likely to integrate vertically. Adopting a reduced-form approach, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504590
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A Model of Vertical Oligopolistic Competition
Reisinger, Markus; Schnitzer, Monika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
This paper develops a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous market entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. Our analysis shows that the downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two-tier structure while the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114429
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Quantifying the Effects from Horizontal Mergers in European Competition Policy
Ivaldi, Marc; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
This Paper starts from a recent case studying how merger analysis in Europe may potentially be improved through simulation analysis. Starting from the product and geographic market definition in the Merger Decision, we formulate and estimate an oligopoly model with differentiated products. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666636
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Buyers' Coordination and Entry
Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
eliminated. Without the penalty, we show that downstream competition also facilitates entry. The stronger the competition among …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789109
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Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Applied Work
Fershtman, Chaim; Pakes, Ariel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
We present a framework for the applied analysis of dynamic games with asymmetric information. The framework consists of a definition of equilibrium, and an algorithm to compute it. Our definition of Applied Markov Perfect equilibrium is an extension of the definition of Markov Perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791237