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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
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Access to Public Capital Markets and Employment Growth
Borisov, Alexander; Ellul, Andrew; Sevilir, Merih - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
This paper investigates the importance of accessing public capital markets through an initial public offering (IPO), and the consequent relaxation of firms’ financial constraints, for firm-level long term employment decisions. We find that firms significantly increase post-IPO investment in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249379
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Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter?
Cornelli, Francesca; Kominek, Zbigniew; Ljungqvist, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008491717
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Does the Stock Market Harm Investment Incentives?
Asker, John; Farre-Mensa, Joan; Ljungqvist, Alexander P. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We examine whether stock market-listed firms in the U.S. invest suboptimally due to agency costs resulting from separation of ownership and control. We derive testable predictions to distinguish between underinvestment due to rational “short-termism” and overinvestment due to “empire...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468621
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Leverage and Asset Bubbles: Averting Armageddon with Chapter 11?
Miller, Marcus; Stiglitz, Joseph E - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
An iconic model with high leverage and overvalued collateral assets is used to illustrate the amplification mechanism driving asset prices to ‘overshoot’ equilibrium when an asset bubble bursts - threatening widespread insolvency and what Richard Koo calls a ‘balance sheet recession’....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528524
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Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity
Acharya, Viral V; Hahn, Moritz; Kehoe, Conor - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We examine deal-level data on private equity transactions in the UK initiated during the period 1996 to 2004 by mature private equity houses. We un-lever the deal-level equity return and adjust for (un-levered) return to quoted peers to extract a measure of "alpha" or abnormal performance of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980202
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The Internal Governance of Firms
Acharya, Viral V; Myers, Stewart C; Rajan, Raghuram G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. We find that internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure firms have substantial value, even without any external governance. Internal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980207
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The Structure of Corporate ownership in Privatized Utilities
Trillas, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
concentration. When political objectives are added to the analysis, it is shown that lobbying with managers induces levels of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123598
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The Origination and Evolution of Ownership and Control
Franks, Julian R; Mayer, Colin; Rossi, Stefano - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
In the first half of the twentieth century, the UK capital markets were marked by an absence of investor protection; by the end of the century, there was more extensive protection there than virtually anywhere else in the world. The UK therefore provides an exceptional laboratory for evaluating...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123634