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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

Rhineland exit?

Bovenberg, A Lans; Teulings, Coen N - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We argue in favour of the shareholder model of the firm for three main reasons, First, serving multiple stakeholders leads to ill-defined property rights. What sounds like a fair compromise between stakeholders can easily evolve in a permanent struggle between the stakeholders about the ultimate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504292

Agency Conflicts, Investment and Asset Pricing

Albuquerque, Rui; Wang, Neng - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

Corporations in many countries are run by controlling shareholders whose cash flow rights in the firm are substantially smaller than their control rights. This separation of ownership and control allows the controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits at the cost of minority investors by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497980

Corporate Liquidity

Dittmar, Amy; Mahrt-Smith, Jan; Servaes, Henri - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

importance of agency costs, we find that managers actually hold larger cash balances when capital markets are better developed …. Our evidence indicates that investors in countries with poor shareholder protection cannot force managers to disgorge …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498063

Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans

Almazan, Andres; Suarez, Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

is optimally compensated by shareholders. Within this setting, we find that managers will submit to monitoring when they …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498142

Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity

Acharya, Viral V; Hahn, Moritz; Kehoe, Conor - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We examine deal-level data on private equity transactions in the UK initiated during the period 1996 to 2004 by mature private equity houses. We un-lever the deal-level equity return and adjust for (un-levered) return to quoted peers to extract a measure of "alpha" or abnormal performance of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980202

The Internal Governance of Firms

Acharya, Viral V; Myers, Stewart C; Rajan, Raghuram G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. We find that internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure firms have substantial value, even without any external governance. Internal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980207

State Capitalism vs. Private Enterprise

Chen, Donghua; Jiang, Dequan; Ljungqvist, Alexander P.; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We study the efficiency of internal capital markets at state-controlled and privately owned business groups in China. Using highly granular data on within-group capital flows, we document stark differences: while private groups allocate more capital to units with better investment opportunities,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011168893

Distressed Acquisitions

Meier, Jean-Marie A.; Servaes, Henri - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Firms that buy distressed and bankrupt companies or some of these companies’ assets earn excess returns that are at least 1.6 percentage points higher than when they make regular acquisitions. These returns come at the expense of the target firm’s shareholders, while overall wealth gains are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083439