regulation is shown to operate at a collective level, regulating each bank as a function of both its joint (correlated) risk with … liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of other banks give rise to a … risk. Regulatory mechanisms such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements that are commonly based only on a …

The merit of having international convergence of bank capital requirements in the presence of divergent closure … policies of different central banks is examined. While the privately optimal level of bank capital decreases with regulatory … forbearance (they are strategic substitutes), the socially optimal level of bank capital increases with regulatory forbearance …

-ante standpoint. We formalize this time-inconsistency of bank regulation. We also argue that by allowing banks to purchase failed …This Paper shows that bank closure policies suffer from a ‘too-many-to-fail’ problem: when the number of bank failures … is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out some or all failed banks, whereas when the number of bank …

As the number of bank failures increases, the set of assets available for acquisition by the surviving banks enlarges … for liquidation of banking assets. At a sufficiently large number of bank failures, and in turn, at a sufficiently low … and allowing the regulator to price-discriminate against outsiders in the market for bank sales. …

credit markets which do not occur when a bank has a monopoly. First, average returns decrease since banks compete for good … if the permissible types of contracts are limited by regulation resembling the separation of investment and commercial …

short-run; leverage requirements reduce default risk but may significantly reduce bank value; mispriced deposit insurance …

Today’s regulatory rules, especially the easily-manipulated measures of regulatory capital, have led to costly bank … failures. We design a robust regulatory system such that (i) bank losses are credibly borne by the private sector (ii …) systemically important institutions cannot collapse suddenly; (iii) bank investment is counter-cyclical; and (iv) regulatory …

creating counter-cyclical incentives for banks to raise capital, and so encourage bank lending in bad times. They avoid the …

-funded capital injections. However, on closer inspection the composition of bank capital shifted radically from one based on common … banks to lend over this period. We draw conclusions on how capital regulation may be reformed in light of our findings. …

behavior. By paying out dividends, a bank transfers value to its shareholders away from creditors, among whom are other banks …. This way, one bank's dividend payout policy affects the equity value and risk of default of other banks. When such negative … externalities are strong and bank franchise values are not too low, the private equilibrium can feature excess dividends relative to …