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The Political Economy of Bank and Equity Dominance
Perotti, Enrico C; von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
Legislation affects corporate governance and the return to human and financial capital. We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the governance structure and the extent of labour rents. In a society where median voters have relatively more at stake in the form of human...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667054
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The Internal Governance of Firms
Acharya, Viral V; Myers, Stewart C; Rajan, Raghuram G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. We find that internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure firms have substantial value, even without any external governance. Internal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980207
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Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation
Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in … a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567
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Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Hart, Oliver - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
This Paper evaluates the primary mechanisms for changing management or obtaining control in publicly traded corporations with dispersed ownership. Specifically, we analyse and compare three mechanisms: (1) proxy fights (voting only); (2) takeover bids (buying shares only); and (3) a combination...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123692
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Equity Block Transfers in Transition Economies: Evidence from Poland
Trojanowski, Grzegorz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper investigates valuation effects of share block transfers and employs agency theory to explain the determinants of block premia. A sample of transactions from Poland is used to measure benefits and costs of ownership concentration. Block premia are found to be substantially lower than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124379
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The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
decisions, directors’ superior information, bargaining by management, pressures on managers to focus on the short …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124408
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Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Hamdani, Assaf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
should err in favour of the arrangement that is less favourable to managers. Such an approach, we show, would make it most …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656367
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Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Cohen, Alma - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper empirically investigates the decisions of US publicly traded firms on where to incorporate. We study the features of states that make them attractive to incorporating firms and the characteristics of firms that determine whether they incorporate in or out of their state of location....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123946
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The Brain Gain of Corporate Boards: A Natural Experiment from China
Giannetti, Mariassunta; Liao, Guanmin; Yu, Xiaoyun - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
We study the impact of directors with foreign experience on firms in emerging markets. To establish causality, we use a unique dataset from China and exploit that at different times, Chinese provinces introduced policies to attract highly talented emigrants. These policies led to an exogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084604
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270