Showing 1 - 10 of 754
exhibits both adverse selection and moral hazard. Depositors do not fully account for the social benefits accruing from bank …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136557
We study the welfare implications of market power in a model where banks choose between credit rationing and monitoring in order to alleviate an underlying moral-hazard problem. We show that the effect of banks’ market power on social welfare is the result of two countervailing effects. On the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656189
bank monitors borrowers more intensively, rations the amount of credit less frequently and hence may go bankrupt with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662062
We base a contracting theory for a start-up firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable effort, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498043
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554231
A 'folk theorem' originating, among others, in the work of Stiglitz maintains that competitive equilibria are always or 'generically' inefficient (unless contracts directly specify consumption levels as in Prescott and Townsend, thus bypassing trading in anonymous markets). This paper critically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468520
Performance indicators are increasingly used to regulate quality in health care and other areas of the public sector. We develop a model of contracting between a purchaser (principal) and a provider (agent) under the following scenarios: a) higher ability increases quality directly and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123654
This Paper analyses an unusually conservative type of redistribution. We take land from the very rich, as usual, but give it to the rich instead of the poor. We show that this type of reform reduces agency costs, thus increasing productivity, total surplus in the economy, and workers’ welfare....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124299
This paper provides an analysis of the health insurance and health care consumption. A structural microeconomic model of joint demand for health insurance and health care is developed and estimated using full maximum likelihood method using Swiss insurance claims data for over 60,000 adult...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124425
We analyse dynamic financial contracting under moral hazard. The ability to rely on future rewards relaxes the tension between incentive and participation constraints, relative to the static case. Managers are incited by the promise of future payments after several successes and the threat of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067486