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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
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Voucher Privatization, Corporate Control and the Cost of Capital: An Analysis of the Czech Privatization Programme
Marcincin, Anton; van Wijnbergen, Sweder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995
Voucher privatization programmes have been criticized for leading to excessively dispersed ownership and hence failure of control and insufficient corporate governance. We analyse the results of the five auction rounds of the Czech privatization programme and subsequent stock market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123768
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Equity Block Transfers in Transition Economies: Evidence from Poland
Trojanowski, Grzegorz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
shareholders’ protection in transitional economies. Shareholder’s opportunities to extract private benefits of control turn out to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124379
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U.S. Monetary Shocks and Global Stock Prices
Laeven, Luc; Tong, Hui - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
This paper studies how U.S. monetary policy affects global stock prices. We find that global stock prices respond strongly to changes in U.S. interest rate policy, with stock prices increasing (decreasing) following unexpected monetary loosening (tightening). This impact is more pronounced for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008692313
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Limits of Limits of Arbitrage: Theory and Evidence
Hombert, Johan; Thesmar, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We present a model where arbitrageurs operate on an asset market that can be hit by information shocks. Before entering the market, arbitrageurs are allowed to optimize their capital structure, in order to take advantage of potential underpricing. We find that, at equilibrium, some arbitrageurs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666728
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Changes in Equity Ownership and Changes in the Market Value of the Firm
Lins, Karl; McConnell, John J.; Servaes, Henri - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
We study the stock price response to announcements of share purchases by corporate insiders over the period 1994 through 1999. The cross-sectional variability in the response is consistent with a curvilinear relation between firm value and insider ownership, where the value of the firm first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123861
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Shareholder Diversification and IPOs
Bodnaruk, Andriy; Kandel, Eugene; Massa, Massimo; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
We study IPOs by focusing on the degree of portfolio diversification of the shareholders taking the company public. We … of the shareholders and relate them to both the probability of the IPO and the underpricing. We show that companies held … by less diversified shareholders are more likely to go public and suffer a higher underpricing. We show that, as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124086
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A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs
Faure-Grimaud, Antoine; Laffont, Jean-Jacques; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998
We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principle delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed supervisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114332
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Distressed Acquisitions
Meier, Jean-Marie A.; Servaes, Henri - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
firm’s shareholders, while overall wealth gains are not affected. Returns to acquirers of distressed assets are higher when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083439