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Choosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations

Haigner, Stefan; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We analyse an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group members. We find a large and positive effect of endogenous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114368

Network Structure and Strategic Investments: An Experimental Analysis

Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

This paper analyzes the effects of network positions and individual risk attitudes on individuals' strategic decisions … in an experiment where actions are strategic substitutes. The game theoretic basis for our experiment is the model of … factors, such as the number of (direct) neighbors, local clustering and individuals' risk attitudes. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136539

Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment

Bouton, Laurent; Castanheira, Micael; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper both theoretically and experimentally studies the properties of plurality and approval voting when the majority is divided as a result of information imperfections. The minority backs a third alternative, which the majority views as strictly inferior. The majority thus faces two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083533

Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

hypothesis of incentive theory is that the seller may want to offer a menu of contracts to separate the buyer types. In the good … information may be welfare-reducing. We have conducted a laboratory experiment with 954 participants to test these hypotheses …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083588

Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders

Casella, Alessandra; Palfrey, Thomas R; Turban, Sébastien - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market. The theory has strong predictions. In both cases …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084134

Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion

Cooper, David J.; Kühn, Kai-Uwe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

to successfully establish collusion, consistent with the existing theory of collusion. However, collusion is even more …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558586

Consumer Networks and Firm Reputation: A First Experimental Investigation

Huck, Steffen; Lünser, Gabriele; Tyran, Jean-Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Arguing that consumers are the carriers of firms’ reputations, we examine the role of consumer networks for trust in markets that suffer from moral hazard. When consumers are embedded in a network, they can exchange information with their neighbours about their private experiences with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661429

On Public Opinion Polls and Voters' Turnout

Klor, Esteban F; Winter, Eyal - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper studies the effects that the revelation of information on the electorate's preferences has on voters' turnout decisions. The experimental data show that closeness in the division of preferences induces a significant increase in turnout. Moreover, for closely divided electorates (and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661831

Competitive equilibrium in Markets for Votes

Casella, Alessandra; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Palfrey, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008534095

Competition Fosters Trust

Huck, Steffen; Ruchala, Gabriele K.; Tyran, Jean-Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We study the effects of reputation and competition in a stylized market for experience goods. If interaction is anonymous, such markets perform poorly: sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not trust sellers. If sellers are identifiable and can, hence, build a reputation, efficiency...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136615