Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 522
Cover Image
Delegated Job Design
Hvide, Hans K; Kaplan, Todd - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
private-information based theory of delegation, where delegation enables high-ability workers to signal their ability by … choosing difficult tasks. Such signalling provides a more efficient allocation of talent inside the firm, but at the cost that … theory for how misallocation of talent within firms may occur and to the design optimal incentive contracts. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123930
Cover Image
Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
Hellwig, Christian; Veldkamp, Laura - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
We explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models. When a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity, information choices exhibit complementarity as well: If an agent wants to do what others do, they want to know what others know. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067365
Cover Image
Information Structures in Optimal Auctions
Bergemann, Dirk; Pesendorfer, Martin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the accuracy by which bidders learn their valuation and to whom to sell at what price. We establish that optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067488
Cover Image
The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures
Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We study the effect of additional private information in an agency model with an endogenous information structure. If more private information becomes available to the agent, this may hurt the agent, benefit the principal, and affect the total surplus ambiguously.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005036239
Cover Image
Network Games with Incomplete Information
De Martí, Joan; Zenou, Yves - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
We consider a network game with strategic complementarities where the individual reward or the strength of interactions is only partially known by the agents. Players receive different correlated signals and they make inferences about other players' information. We demonstrate that there exists...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096094
Cover Image
Independence and Heterogeneity in Games of Incomplete Information
Mason, Robin; Valentinyi, Akos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
This Paper provides a sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in monotone pure strategies, in games of incomplete information. First, we show that if each player's incremental ex post pay-off is uniformly increasing in its own action and type, and its type is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114177
Cover Image
Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: Competing Auctions and Competitive Search without Ex Ante Price Commitment
Kim, Kyungmin; Kircher, Philipp - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
We consider a frictional two-sided matching market in which one side uses public cheap-talk announcements so as to attract the other side. We show that if the first-price auction is adopted as the trading protocol, then cheap talk can be perfectly informative, and the resulting market outcome is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083306
Cover Image
Efficient Cheap Talk in Directed Search: On the Non-essentiality of Commitment in Market Games
Kim, Kyungmin; Kircher, Philipp - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
Directed search models are market games in which each firm announces a wage commitment to attract a worker. Miscoordination among workers generates search frictions, yet in equilibrium more productive firms post more attractive wage commitments to fill their vacancies faster, which yields...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083578
Cover Image
Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory
Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
hypothesis of incentive theory is that the seller may want to offer a menu of contracts to separate the buyer types. In the good …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083588
Cover Image
Premise-Based versus Outcome-Based Information Aggregation
de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
A group of rational individuals with common interest need to select one of two outcomes. The optimal decision depends on whether certain premises or pieces of evidence are established as being true, and each member receives a noisy signal of the truth value of the relevant premises. Should the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083847