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Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Cohen, Alma - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper empirically investigates the decisions of US publicly traded firms on where to incorporate. We study the features of states that make them attractive to incorporating firms and the characteristics of firms that determine whether they incorporate in or out of their state of location....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123946
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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
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The Brain Gain of Corporate Boards: A Natural Experiment from China
Giannetti, Mariassunta; Liao, Guanmin; Yu, Xiaoyun - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
We study the impact of directors with foreign experience on firms in emerging markets. To establish causality, we use a unique dataset from China and exploit that at different times, Chinese provinces introduced policies to attract highly talented emigrants. These policies led to an exogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084604
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Taking the Lord's Name in Vain: The Impact of Connected Directors on 19th century British Banks
Grossman, Richard; Imai, Masami - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
This paper utilizes data on the presence of prominent individuals—that is, those with political (e.g., Members of Parliament) and aristocratic titles (e.g., lords)--on the boards of directors of English and Welsh banks from 1879-1909 to investigate whether the appointment of well-connected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145404
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Ambiguity, Disagreement, and Allocation of Control in Firms
Dicks, David L.; Fulghieri, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
We present a novel source of disagreement grounded in decision theory: ambiguity aversion. We show that ambiguity aversion generates endogenous disagreement between a firm's insider and outside shareholders, creating a new rationale for corporate governance systems. In our paper, optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213312
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Delegated Activism and Disclosure
Dasgupta, Amil; Zachariadis, Konstantinos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
Mutual funds are significant blockholders in many corporations. Concerns that funds vote in a pro-management manner to garner lucrative pensions contracts led the SEC to mandate the disclosure of proxy votes. We present a model of mutual fund voting in the presence of potential business ties. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321841
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Corporate Control and Executive Selection
Lippi, Francesco; Schivardi, Fabiano - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We present a model in which the owner of the firm enjoys a private benefit from developing a personal relationship with the executives. This may lead the owner to retain a senior executive in office even though a more productive replacement is available. The model shows that the private returns...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008677237
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Stock Market Returns, Corporate Governance and Capital Market Equilibrium
Parigi, Bruno; Pelizzon, Loriana; von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
managerial agency problem correctly. Our theory assumes that strict corporate governance prevents managers from diverting cash …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165663
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The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options
Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
We develop a stylized model of efficient contracting in which firms compete for CEOs. The optimal contracts are designed to retain and insure CEOs. The retention motive explains pay-for-luck in executive compensation, while the insurance feature explains asymmetric pay-for-luck. We show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084007