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Property Crime with Private Protection: A Market-for-Offenses Approach
Hotte, Louis; Valognes, Fabrice; van Ypersele, Tanguy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
We propose a market-for-offenses model of property crime, which explicitly accounts for protection expenditures among … heterogeneous individuals. The crime equilibrium is modeled as a free-access equilibrium in which the match between criminals and … victims equates the average returns to crime. We borrow from the literature on the economics of conflicts in order to define …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504660
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Spillover Effects, Bank Lending and Growth
Altug, Sumru G.; Usman, Murat - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
opportunities and asymmetric information in credit markets. We show that such features may lead to strategic considerations in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789112
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Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure
Aney, Madhav; Ghatak, Maitreesh; Morelli, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We study how inefficiencies of market failure may be further amplified by political choices made by interest groups created in the inefficient market. We take an occupational choice framework, where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In our model, market failure due to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246601
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Descent Rules and Strategic Transfers. Evidence from Matrilineal Groups in Ghana
La Ferrara, Eliana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
Traditional descent systems can roughly be divided into patrilineal and matrilineal. In the latter, a man’s heir is not his own child but rather his sister’s son. The paper examines the implications of this social norm for the pattern of inter-vivos transfers using household level data from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791695
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Social Connections and Group Banking
Karlan, Dean S. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
Lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening, monitoring, and enforcement costs. Group lending advocates believe lenders overcome this by harnessing social connections. Using data from FINCA-Peru, I exploit a quasi random group formation process to find evidence of peers successfully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791873
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Anonymous Banking and Financial Repression: How Does China's Reform Limit Government Predation without Reducing Its Revenue?
Bai, Chong-En; Li, David Daokui; Qian, Yingyi; Wang, Yijiang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
China's economic performance of the past two decades presents a puzzle for the economics of transition and development: Enormous private business incentives were unleashed that have fueled rapid economic growth despite the fact that China has had very weak "conventional institutions" (such as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067480
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Kin Groups and Reciprocity: A Model of Credit Transactions in Ghana
La Ferrara, Eliana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
credit. The first is that incentives to default are lower for community members who can expect retaliation to fall on their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504436
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Group versus Individual Liability: A Field Experiment in the Philippines
Giné, Xavier; Karlan, Dean S. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
Group liability is often portrayed as the key innovation that led to the explosion of the microcredit movement, which started with the Grameen Bank in the 1970s and continues on today with hundreds of institutions around the world. Group lending claims to improve repayment rates and lower...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656151
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Bribes, Lobbying and Development
Harstad, Bård; Svensson, Jakob - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
Why are firms more likely to pay bribes to bureaucrats to bend the rules in developing countries while they instead lobby the government to change the rules in more developed ones? Should we expect an evolution from bribing to lobbying, or can countries get trapped in a bribing equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661993
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Red Tape and Corruption
Guriev, Sergei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
We study the emergence and interaction of red tape and corruption in a principal-bureaucrat-agent hierarchy. The principal is to provide the agent with a unit of a good that involves externalities so that market mechanisms fail to achieve first best. Red tape partially solves the problem. While...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123811