bank suffering from liquidity shocks, we find that the unregulated bank keeps too much liquidity and monitors too little. A … central bank can alleviate the liquidity problem, but induces moral hazard. Therefore, we introduce an additional authority … that is able to bail out the bank either by injecting capital at a fixed return or by receiving an equity claim. This …

We analyse the implications for the pricing of bank loans of the reform of capital regulation known as Basel II. We …-sensitive standardized approach of Basel II. We also show that only an extremely high social cost of bank failure might justify the proposed …

the market for bank loans and how a central can compensate such shocks. The need for unconventional measures derives from … the size of these shocks and the zero lower bound of the central bank's policy rate. Under such conditions the central … bank can only stabilize the loan market by providing direct loans to the non-bank sector. A by-product of this approach is …

. Using a model of a systemic bank suffering from liquidity shocks, we find that the unregulated bank keeps too much liquidity … induces moral hazard. Therefore, we introduce a fiscal authority that is able to bail out the bank by injecting capital. This …

particular, we show that the stock market applies far greater discounts to a bank’s real estate loans and mortgage … suggests that bank balance sheets overvalue real estate related assets during economic slowdowns. Estimated discounts are … impairment. We also find that bank share prices, especially for banks with large exposures to mortgage-backed securities, react …

liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of other banks give rise to a … risk. Regulatory mechanisms such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements that are commonly based only on a … bank’s own risk fail to mitigate aggregate risk-shifting incentives, and can, in fact, accentuate systemic risk. Prudential …

We model the interaction between two economies where banks exhibit both adverse selection and moral hazard and bank … regulators try to resolve these problems. We find that liberalizing bank capital flows between economies reduces total welfare by … considerations arise in this context. Allowing multinationals improves welfare when bank capital can flow across borders, despite the …

The merit of having international convergence of bank capital requirements in the presence of divergent closure … policies of different central banks is examined. While the privately optimal level of bank capital decreases with regulatory … forbearance (they are strategic substitutes), the socially optimal level of bank capital increases with regulatory forbearance …