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Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion

Cooper, David J.; Kühn, Kai-Uwe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We use experiments to analyze what type of communication is most effective in achieving cooperation in a simple …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558586

The Dark Side of the Vote: Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting

Morton, Rebecca; Piovesan, Marco; Tyran, Jean-Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a “dark side”, i.e. result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. We develop a model to predict how...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083707

Trust and Deterrence

Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper presents results from a laboratory experiment on the channels through which different law enforcement strategies deter cartel formation. With leniency policies offering immunity to the first reporting party a high fine is the main determinant of deterrence, having a strong effect even...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084601

On the Selection of Arbitrators

de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir; Knight, Brian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

A key issue in arbitration, which resolves disputes among parties, involves the procedure for selecting an arbitrator. We take an implementation-theoretic approach and provide theoretical, empirical and experimental analyses of this problem. Our findings highlight the problems with current...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399707

Competitive equilibrium in Markets for Votes

Casella, Alessandra; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Palfrey, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of Ex Ante Vote-Trading Equilibrium, identify weak sufficient conditions for existence, and construct one such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008534095

Competition Fosters Trust

Huck, Steffen; Ruchala, Gabriele K.; Tyran, Jean-Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We study the effects of reputation and competition in a stylized market for experience goods. If interaction is anonymous, such markets perform poorly: sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not trust sellers. If sellers are identifiable and can, hence, build a reputation, efficiency...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136615

Choosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations

Haigner, Stefan; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

find a large and positive effect of endogenous institutional choice on the level of cooperation in comparison to … exogenously implemented institutions. This suggests that democratic participation rights enhance cooperation in groups. With … high levels of cooperation. Our results are evaluated against the predictions of social preference models. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114368

Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment

Bouton, Laurent; Castanheira, Micael; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper both theoretically and experimentally studies the properties of plurality and approval voting when the majority is divided as a result of information imperfections. The minority backs a third alternative, which the majority views as strictly inferior. The majority thus faces two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083533

Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

In the basic adverse selection model, a seller makes a contract offer to a privately informed buyer. A fundamental hypothesis of incentive theory is that the seller may want to offer a menu of contracts to separate the buyer types. In the good state of nature, total surplus is not different from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083588

Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders

Casella, Alessandra; Palfrey, Thomas R; Turban, Sébastien - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study the implication of such trading for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084134

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