We consider a model in which banks face two moral hazard problems: 1) asset substitution by shareholders, which can occur when banks make socially-inefficient, risky loans; and 2) managerial under-provision of effort in loan monitoring. The privately-optimal level of bank leverage is neither too...

When a sovereign faces the risk of debt default, it may be tempted to expropriate the private sector. This may be one reason for why international investment in private companies has to take into account the sovereign risk. But the likelihood of a transfer from the sovereign risk to corporate...

Using a sample that provides unprecedented detail on foreign listings, new listings, and delistings for 29 exchanges in 24 countries starting from the early 1980s, we document a growing tendency of listings to concentrate in the U.S. and the U.K. and large changes in all exchanges’ ability to...

We examine how shareholder investment horizons influence firms’ payout decisions. We find that US firms held by short-term institutional investors have a higher propensity to buybacks shares instead of using dividends. Firm managers seem to respond to the preferred payout policy of investors...