constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

the shareholders of existing companies would not be served by adopting those default arrangements that public officials … between two or more default arrangements and face significant uncertainty as to which one would best serve shareholders, they … should err in favour of the arrangement that is less favourable to managers. Such an approach, we show, would make it most …

This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in … a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock …

We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We …

concentration. When political objectives are added to the analysis, it is shown that lobbying with managers induces levels of … shareholder dispersion that are higher than in the benchmark case. Collusion with large shareholders, however, may yield higher …

) takeover bids (buying shares only); and (3) a combination of proxy fights and takeover bids in which shareholders vote on … cash or the acquirer’s existing securities, voting shareholders can infer from the pre-vote market trading which outcome …

shareholders, the widely held professionally managed corporation emerges as the equilibrium outcome. In legal regimes with … intermediate protection, management is delegated to a professional, but the family stays on as large shareholders to monitor the …