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Regulation Games
Gilbert, Richard; Newbery, David M G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1988
We examine regulation as a repeated game between a regulator and a utility facing a Markovian sequence of demands. Sunk … regulation can improve on these equilibrium outcomes, although at higher consumer costs, and only if state-contingent transfers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792339
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Regulating a Multi-Utility Firm
Calzolari, Giacomo; Scarpa, Carlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
We study the regulation of a utility firm which is active in a competitive unregulated sector as well. If the firm … and quantity competition) and also optimal regulation. Accounting for the several effects of regulation on the unregulated … market, we show the existence of an informational externality, in that regulation provides useful information to the rival …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124135
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More Insiders, More Insider Trading: Evidence from Private Equity Buyouts
Acharya, Viral V; Johnson, Tim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
. They are unlikely to be consistent with models of optimal regulation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498160
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The Dog that Did Not Bark: Insider Trading and Crashes
Vigueras, Marín; Maria, José; Olivier, Jacques - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
phenomenon based on trading constraints and asymmetric information. A key feature of our theory is that rational uninformed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666589
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Front-running by Mutual Fund Managers: It ain't that Bad
Danthine, Jean-Pierre; Moresi, Serge X - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996
This paper evaluates the welfare implications of front-running by mutual fund managers. It extends the model of Kyle (1985) to a situation in which the insider with fundamentals-information competes against an insider with trade-information and in which noise trading is endogenized. Noise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123513
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Investment Banks as Insiders and the Market for Corporate Control
Bodnaruk, Andriy; Massa, Massimo; Simonov, Andrei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We study holdings in M&A targets by financial conglomerates which affiliated investment banks advise the bidders. We show that advisors take positions in the targets before M&A announcements. These stakes are positively related to the probability of observing the bid and to the target premium....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123703
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Information Sales and Insider Trading
Cespa, Giovanni - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
Fundamental information resembles in many respects a durable good. Hence, the effects of its incorporation into stock prices depend on who is the agent controlling its flow. Similarly to a durable goods monopolist, a monopolistic analyst selling information intertemporally competes against...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067575
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Participation Games: Market Entry, Coordination and the Beautiful Blonde
Anderson, Simon P; Engers, Maxim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
We find the Nash equilibria for monotone n-player symmetric games where each player chooses whether to participate. Examples include market entry games, coordination games, and the bar-room game depicted in the movie 'A Beautiful Mind'. The symmetric Nash equilibrium involves excessive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662078
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How Should Control Theory be Used by a Time-Consistent Government?
Cohen, Daniel; Michel, Philippe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1986
-Nash equilibrium and to an optimal policy rule. In each case, we show how control theory should or should not be applied to calculate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666548
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Price Stability as a Nash Equilibrium in Monetary Open-Economy Models
Benigno, Gianluca; Benigno, Pierpaolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
A two-country dynamic general-equilibrium model with imperfect competition and price stickiness is considered. This work shows the conditions under which price stability can implement the flexible-price allocation as a Nash equilibrium. This is possible if and only if both countries maintain a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136428