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Venture Capital, Patenting, and Usefulness of Innovations
Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We analyze incentives to develop entrepreneurial ideas for venture capitalists (VCs) and incumbent firms. If VCs are sufficiently better at judging an idea's value and if it is sufficiently more costly to patent low than high value ideas, VCs acquire valuable ideas, develop them beyond the level...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643508
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Venture Capital and Industrial ''Innovation''
Hirukawa, Masayuki; Ueda, Masako - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
measure of innovation alternative to patent count. Unlike the impact on patent count, we do not find that VC investment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136420
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Optimal Public Policy for Venture Capital Backed Innovation
Keuschnigg, Christian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
regard to the capital gains tax, innovation subsidy, public R&D spending and other policy initiatives. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497714
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Venture Capital and Knowledge Transfer
Dessí, Roberta; Yin, Nina - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
communicate valuable knowledge to an entrepreneur, facilitating innovation. The venture capitalist can also communicate the … transfer, and their implications for investment, innovation, and product market competition. The model also sheds light on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011168896
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Innovation, Spillovers and Venture Capital Contracts
Dessí, Roberta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
Innovative start-ups and venture capitalists are highly clustered, benefiting from localized spillovers: Silicon Valley is perhaps the best example. There is also substantial geographical variation in venture capital contracts: California contracts are more 'incomplete'. This paper explores the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084393
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Venture Capital and Innovation: Which is First?
Hirukawa, Masayuki; Ueda, Masako - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
that venture capital investments stimulate innovation ('VC-first hypothesis'). This interpretation is, however, one …-sided because there may be a reverse causality that innovations induce venture capital investments ('innovation-first hypothesis … causality issue of venture capital investments and innovation in the US manufacturing industry using both total factor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666846
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The Organization of the Innovation Industry: Entrepreneurs, Venture Capitalists and Oligopolists
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
Exit of venture-backed firms often takes place through sales to large incumbent firms. We show that in such an environment, venture-backed firms have a stronger incentive to develop basic innovations into commercialized innovations than incumbent firms, due to strategic product market effects....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791605
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The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping
Bergemann, Dirk; Hege, Ulrich - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
This Paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. The uncertainty about future success diminishes gradually with the arrival of additional funding. The entrepreneur controls the funds and can divert...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791971
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Entrepreneurs and New Ideas
Biais, Bruno; Perotti, Enrico C - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
Innovative ideas are novel combinations of productive resources potentially addressing an economic need (Schumpeter, 1926). Even promising ideas can be unprofitable if the proposed combination fails on at least one dimension, e.g., it is technically unfeasible or does not respond to a genuine...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792312
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Contractual Execution, Strategic Incompleteness and Venture Capital
Dessí, Roberta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
Contractual execution generates hard information, available to the contracting parties, even when contracts are secretly executed. Building on this simple observation, the paper shows that incomplete contracts can be preferred to complete contracts. This is because (i) execution of incomplete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976792