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Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections

Do, Quoc-Anh; Lee, Yen-Teik; Nguyen, Bang Dang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

procurement contracts and invest more than do firms connected to the loser. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249372

Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening

Calzolari, Giacomo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study the tension between competitive screening and contract enforcement where a principal trades repeatedly with one among several agents, moral hazard and adverse selection coexist, and non-contractible dimensions are governed by relational contracting. We simultaneously characterize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082534

Procurement with specialized firms

Boone, Jan; Schottmüller, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

This paper analyzes optimal procurement mechanisms in a setting where the procurement agency has incomplete information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009385768

Procuring Innovation

Cabral, Luís M B; Cozzi, Guido; Denicolò, Vincenzo; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

, including ideas and research, from their strategic suppliers. A careful design of procurement policy is crucial to make … potential suppliers generate and sell the most suitable innovation. Moreover, procurement by public agencies and large firms … consider a menu of procurement methods and policies for best procuring new knowledge and innovative products, discussing their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791875

Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions

Cantillon, Estelle; Pesendorfer, Martin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper considers the problem of identification and estimation in the first-price multi-unit auction. It is motivated by the auctions of bus routes held in London where bidders submit bids on combinations of routes as well as on individual routes. We show that submitting a combination bid...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791983

Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976795

When are Auctions Best?

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We compare the two most common bidding processes for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly to buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding process earlier entrants can make bids before later entrants choose whether to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123726

Optimal Procurement When Both Price and Quality Matter

Asker, John; Cantillon, Estelle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

A buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have private information about their cost structure (fixed cost + marginal cost of providing quality). We solve for the optimal buying mechanism, i.e. the procedure that maximizes the buyer’s expected...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123964

Delegation and the Ratchet Effect: Should Regulators Be Pro-Industry?

Currie, David; Levine, Paul L; Rickman, Neil - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

delegation in the context of a cost-reimbursement procurement problem. Our solution combines several features of the modern …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136782

Properties of Scoring Auctions

Asker, John; Cantillon, Estelle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of non monetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behaviour...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497976