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Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

An important lesson from the incentive literature is that explicit incentives may elicit dysfunctional and unintended responses, also known as gaming responses. The existence of these responses, however, is difficult to demonstrate in practice because this behaviour is typically hidden from the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114434

Performance Incentives with Award Constraints

Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper studies the provision of incentives in a large US training organization, which is divided into about 50 independent pools of training agencies. The number and the size of the agencies within each pool vary greatly. Each pool distributes performance incentive awards to the training...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661877

Delegated Job Design

Hvide, Hans K; Kaplan, Todd - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

private-information based theory of delegation, where delegation enables high-ability workers to signal their ability by … theory for how misallocation of talent within firms may occur and to the design optimal incentive contracts. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123930

Active Agents, Passive Principals: Does High-Powered CEO Compensation Really Improve Incentives

Dow, James; Raposo, Clara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

In this Paper we use agency theory to study the active role of the CEO in the formulation of corporate strategy. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504388

Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

A central insight of agency theory is that when a principal offers a contract to a privately informed agent, the … particular, we investigate settings with both exogenous and endogenous information structures. We find that theory is indeed a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789080

Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights … are reflected by the behavior of subjects in the laboratory and to what extent deviations from standard theory can be … agency theory is indeed useful to qualitatively predict how variations in the degree of uncertainty affect subjects' behavior …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084433

An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives

Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper studies a particular kind of gaming response to explicit incentives in a large government organization. The gaming responses we consider occur when agents strategically report their performance outcomes to maximize their awards. An important contribution of this work is to examine...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662347

Curbing Cream-Skimming: Evidence on Enrolment Incentives

Courty, Pascal; Kim, Do Han; Marschke, Gerald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Using data from a large, U.S. federal job training program, we investigate whether enrolment incentives that exogenously vary the ‘shadow prices’ for serving different demographic subgroups of clients influence case workers’ intake decisions. We show that case workers enroll more clients...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666832

Serial CEO Incentives and the Structure of Managerial Contracts

Giannetti, Mariassunta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper analyzes the optimal contracting consequences of a recent phenomenon in the managerial labour market, CEO job hopping. I show that if the managerial labour market is thin and firm growth opportunities are weak, the optimal contract rewards the CEO for past performance through a bonus....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504521

Prisoners' Other Dilemma

Blonski, Matthias; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

Collusive agreements and relational contracts are commonly modeled as equilibria of dynamic games with the strategic features of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. The pay-offs agents obtain when being ‘cheated upon’ by other agents play no role in these models. We propose a way to take these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666887

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