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Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence from Commitment via International Trade Agreements

Limão, Nuno; Tovar, Patricia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Why do governments employ inefficient policies to redistribute income towards special interest groups (SIGs) when more efficient ones are available? To address this puzzle we derive and test predictions for a set of policies where detailed data is available and an efficiency ranking is feasible:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136624

Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions

Claessens, Stijn; Feijen, Erik; Laeven, Luc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Using novel indicators of political connections constructed from campaign contribution data, we show that Brazilian firms that provided contributions to (elected) federal deputies experienced higher stock returns than firms that don’t around the 1998 and 2002 elections. This suggests...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666705

Political Conflict and Power-Sharing in the Origins of Modern Colombia

Mazzuca, Sebastián L; Robinson, James A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

civil war and conflict, a force intensified by the brutal conflict of the War of a Thousand days between 1899 and 1902. The … the parties in the population, thus encouraging conflict. The strategic advantage of PR was that it avoided such under … origins of electoral systems and the nature of political conflict and its resolution. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114374

Higher Vote Thresholds for Incumbents, Effort and Selection

Gersbach, Hans - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

The election mechanism has difficulties in selecting the most able candidates and deselecting less able ones. In a simple model we show that the power of elections as a selection and incentive device can be improved by requiring higher vote thresholds than 50% for incumbents. A higher vote...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005025512

Private Provision of Public Goods and Information Diffusion in Social Groups

Scharf, Kimberley - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We describe a model of fundraising in social groups, where private information about quality of provision is transmitted by social proximity. Individuals engage in voluntary provision of a pure collective good that is consumed by both neighbors and non-neighbors. We show that, unlike in the case...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320406

Pandering to Persuade

Che, Yeon-Koo; Dessein, Wouter; Kartik, Navin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

A principal chooses one of n=2 projects or an outside option. An agent is privately informed about the projects' benefits and shares the principal's preferences except for not internalizing her value from the outside option. We show that strategic communication is characterized by pandering: the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008466340

Protecting Minorities in Binary Elections. A Test of Storable Votes Using Field Data

Casella, Alessandra; Ehrenberg, Shuky; Gelman, Andrew; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Democratic systems are built, with good reason, on majoritarian principles, but their legitimacy requires the protection of strongly held minority preferences. The challenge is to do so while treating every voter equally and preserving aggregate welfare. One possible solution is storable votes:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662342

Does Tax Competition Tame the Leviathan?

Brülhart, Marius; Jametti, Mario - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study the impact of tax competition on equilibrium taxes and welfare, focusing on the jurisdictional fragmentation of federations. In a representative-agent model of fiscal federalism, fragmentation among jurisdictions with benevolent tax-setting authorities unambiguously reduces welfare. If,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666467

Legislative Process with Open Rules

Fahrenberger, Theresa; Gersbach, Hans - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We first show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789056

Vote-share Contracts and Democracy

Gersbach, Hans - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

In this paper we introduce vote-share contracts. Such contracts contain a vote-share threshold that incumbents must reach in order to be reelected. In a simple model, we illustrate the working of vote-share contracts. Such vote-share contracts curb socially detrimental incumbency advantages by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791280

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