Showing 1 - 10 of 89
Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123608
In this study we extend our previous work to examine the dynamic relationship between violence committed by Palestinian factions and that committed by Israel during the Second Intifada. We find a statistically significant relationship between Israeli fatalities claimed by groups associated with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123813
We analyse the coordination problem in multi-creditor relationships empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that contains detailed credit-file information on distressed lending relationships in Germany, including information on creditor pools, a legal institution aiming at coordinating...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123994
We consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in which players' abilities are stochastic, but become common knowledge before efforts are expended. Players whose expected ability is lower than that of their rivals may still earn a positive expected payoff from participating in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124335
We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes ("lifeboat seats"). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of prizes ("lifeboats"). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition ("a lifeboat"). Then each player competes for a prize in the subset...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082545
This paper uses scoring matching techniques and event study analysis to elucidate the impact of terrorism across different economic sectors. Using the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case study, we differentiate between Israeli companies that belong to the defence, security or anti-terrorism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067462
Many conflicts and negotiations can be viewed as a dynamic game, where parties have no commitment power. In our model, a potential aggressor demands concessions from the weaker party by threatening a war. The absence of commitment makes a continuous stream of transfers a more effective...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114441
This paper starts from the observation that despite their very high levels of unemployment, major European countries have devoted few resources to reducing it. This suggests that there is little political concern about high unemployment. I develop a model where the government tries to increase...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498035
Leaders compensate supporters not just for performing their duties but also in order to preempt an overthrow by the same supporters. We show how succession rules affect the power of leaders relative to supporters as well as the resources expended on possible succession struggles. We compare two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498064
Should privately informed agents with diverging interests act independently or should they commit to a mechanism? This paper analyzes different communication and decision protocols when communication involves delay. It studies under which conditions agents should (i) choose their actions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498109